On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:00, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/6/2016 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If we think about engineering an autonomous being it becomes
obvious that this is a good architecture. Decision making should
be hierarchical with only a few requiring system-wide
consideration. With RF communication this autonomous being could
easily "be"in both Moscow and Washington.
I agree. Of course this does not change the step 3 conclusion if
that is needed to say. There is just no RF communication available,
But that's where you're taking for granted physics which, later,
you're going to conclude is to be inferred from statistics on
computations and is otiose.
But in this thread, we are not "later". I guess you allude to step
seven. You cannot use step seven to confuse people on step 3.
It's like saying A, B, C, D, ...entail Z, but Z shows there's no
reason believe A.
This we will discuss when we arrive at step 7.
(And francly, where is the problem:? it happens that a conclusion
leads to discharge some hypotheses, but here, you seem also to confuse
the assumption that there is a physical reality at the metalevel, and
the assumption that there is a primary physical, at the actual level
of a metaphysical theory).
Again, we are at the step 3 only, which is just the first person
indeterminacy (imagine in a physical implementation of the protocols).
To solve the mind body problem, we must suppose there is a mind, and
there is a body, before reducing one to the second, or vice versa, or
both from something else.
I understand that the conclusion can seem startling, so that we can
come back often on older step in the reasoning, but still, if you do
find something invalid in the step_0 to step_3 reasoning, you cannot
invoke step seven to claim that something is invalid.
I guess you do accept step 3, and just worried that it will be misused
later. But that must be discussed later.
I think you've agreed that physics is necessary to our world,
whether primary or not.
I would say it is the main result: physics is necessary of the
universal machine, from its 1p view, because physics for it is a
consequence of being a machine.
But if physics is shown necessary in arithmetic, physics is no more
primary. It is explained by what the numbers observe, and what is
observable.
So I suggest that instead of starting with the hypothesis that
consciousness is a computation,
Please, I insist that consciousness is NOT a computation.
Consciousness is an 1p notion, and you cannot identify it with *any*
3p. I prefer to use knowledge, for which incompleteness makes the
classical definition working (and saving the 1p from *any* 3p-
reductionisme.
let's leave questions of consciousness to the end and start with
Tegmark 2.0, "Physics is computation". Then I take Bruno's version
to be:
A. The totality of reality consists of all possible computable
universes and histories
It is just ultra-elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic).
Nothing else is assumed, except, here at the meta-level,
computationalism (the belief I can survive with a physical digital
transplant + Church-Thesis)
The existence of all computation is a metatheorem of RA, and a theorem
of PA.
The TOE does not assume anything more.
B. Mathematics is real.
Nope. I just assume that 0 + x = x, ...
I do not philosophy of that type.
C. An UD will realize all possible computation, and hence the
totality of reality.
Brent, please reread the UDA. The UD, and thus elementary (sigma_1)
arithmetical truth realizes all possible computations, but the
realities must be recovered by the measure self-referential problem.
We get an intuitionist logic for the first person, and a quantum logic
for the 1p-plural, has needed. And incompleteness provides the
separation between what the machine can justify and what is true, and
this for each different points of view notion.
I translate the mind-body problem into a an arithmetical body problem
for the universal machine, and let you know what the universal machine
already told us.
UD does not realize the totality of reality, it realizes only the base
3p domain of the 1p indeterminacy, which gives consciousness and
physics, but refer to a highly non-computable reality.
It is like the Skolem-paradox: Elementary arithmetic, or elementary
combinator algebra, seen from inside is big, bigger than arithmetic,
even bigger than analysis, and with comp, plausibly bigger than
mathematics.
D. The world of our experience is a thread, or threads, of the UD
computation that, according to some measure, have statistical
coherence and hence realize a world with the regularity that we
interpret as "the laws of physics".
On the contrary, the physical reality is defined by what is observable
(from the sigma_ true sentences (the leaves of the UD) in all the
accessible world which are either true, or consistent, or both. ([]p &
p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p).
It is like Kant: the physical is a modality of the mind of the
universal machine. And you can defined the mind of the universal
machine by all possible machine "dreams" (as we assume
computationalism, this make sense).
If that argument is accepted, then even if consciousness is an
epiphenomenon of physics, it will still be a some computational
entity in the universe picked out by our "laws of physics".
?
From there Bruno may well argue that the threads of consciousness
are certainly epistemologically prior and we should regard them as
fundamental and "the laws of physics" are inferences (which change
with new data).
I don't think we have any choice in the matter. If you say yes to the
doctor, the reasoning shows that physics *has to be * derivable from
addition and multiplication of the integers. And that in some precise
way, especially if you ant keep the distinction between qualia and
quanta.
I have derived a non trivial part of physics, and well,
computationalism, or a "toy" version if you want, has passed the test
with success. He would have failed in appearance, would the physicists
have claimed that the observable obeys classical logic.
I don't believe, without evidence, that a God/Matter can select the
"real" computations among "non real" in arithmetic. Computationalism
works only if it justifies the appearances of such God/Matter.
I give a problem, that's all. And a bit of the universal machine's own
proposal.
Bruno
Brent
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