On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:35, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
> It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication.
Question 2: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be
uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain
about the outcome of that experience at time t.
As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true,
it depends on if you have forgotten something or not. When i was
in the fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with
certainty what the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only
certain I was undoubtedly correct too. Today I could look it up but
right now, although much time has passed, I am uncertain what the
capital of Wyoming is.
> You have answered both questions positively in your posts of
the 02 August and 03 August respectively.
Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no
duplication or identical environments after duplication so, as I
also explained in my previous post, personal pronouns and the
identity of the mysterious Mr. You is not important. And I might add
if the environments are identical then although there are 2 brains
there is only one individual because thinking is what brains do and
the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2 environmental
inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are doing
is also identical.
> Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence
of answering "yes" to the questions 1 and 2.
Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to
Moscow and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about THE
FPI and the probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is
just ridiculous.
On the contrary. Once you have a bit of empathy with yourself you
listen to whatever the copies can say, and a nine years old child get
the point when doing that.
The rest is playing with words and ad hominem boring distractions.
Bruno
And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being
equivalent to one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not.
With Everett the identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal
clear and can always be uniquely and unambiguously defined:
YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe
that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way.
But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition
and talking about THE FPI as if there were only one is just silly.
> do you see why it entails the FPI?
What I don't see is how THE FPI can exist at all in a world with
person duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for
"person" and the person has been duplicated, YOU have been
duplicated, all of YOU has been duplicated. All. I think your
confusion stems entirely from something you said a few posts ago,
something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom from day one at the
very start of your "proof":
"Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person
point of view"
If that's true then computationalism is false, but you can't use
an assumption that computationalism is false to prove that
computationalism is false.
John K Clark
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