On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> The question is not about duplication.
OK.
And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what
"YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating
machine are not around.
> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking
coffee") = 1.
The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question
is not about duplication"
The question 2 was not about duplication, but the question 1 was, and
you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal to one.
You already contradict your recent post where you said that question
1, which was clearly about duplication, admit a positive answer.
QED.
Bruno
but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU
duplicating machine, so John Clark will not assign any
probability of any sort about the one and only one thing
that will happen to "YOU". It's just plain
dumb.
> Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting
by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by
Monet in the other reconstitution box.
Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have
been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability
that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal
think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make
things less ambiguous?
> The key point here, is that we don't tell you which
reconstitution box contains which painting. [...]
Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment
and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains
which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains
the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet ,
and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU
duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that
information help in the slightest way in determining what one and
only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" are
duplicated? It's just plain dumb.
> P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door")
P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is
over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be?
To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after
"YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and
only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki
man as he's no longer around,.... oh I know, we ask "YOU".
> OK?
No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get.
> Can we move to step 4?
Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing
"YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines.
John K Clark
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