In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The
"execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the
steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and
duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must
have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their
relation to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven.
Brent
On 9/10/2016 7:22 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi,
Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of
the moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations?
On Saturday, August 27, 2016 at 7:44:16 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 11:38 PM, Charles Goodwin
<crg...@gmail.com <javascript:>> wrote:
> Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar
things with
> Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I
think (from
> memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help?
>
> I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor" and so on. At step 7 we reach the
point where
> we assume that a physical Universal Dovetailer can be created
and that it
> runs forever, and ask what is the probability that my observer
moments are
> generated by it, rather than by my brain.
>
> Now ISTM that the UD will have an infinite number of possible
programmes to
> run, so even if it runs forever, how does it get on to the
second step in
> any of them?
Every program can be mapped to a natural number (intuitively, imagine
the binary encoding of a program in any Turing-complete language).
With something akin to the binary encoding (more abstractly, you can
do this to the state table of a Universal Turing Machine), program
size increases with their numbers.
Then the dovetailer proceeds like so:
- execute step 1 of program 1
- execute step 2 of program 1
- execute step 1 of program 2
- execute step 3 of program 1
- execute step 2 of program 2
- execute step 1 of program 3
...
So it will only take finite time for all the computable programs
of up
to a certain size to finish.
Telmo.
>
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