"...an "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time"."
I agree that there is no natural preference for a basis of the threads, but ISTM that each Intelligence has its very own basis of biases which it "determines" as its optimal preference in a moment by moment adaptation on surfaces of constant time. There is some merit in the capacity to "look ahead" over multiple moves, but from what I have studied so far, there are rapidly diminishing returns when one is considering environments that are not fixed - as real world environments tend to be. On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 8:13 PM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The >> "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the >> steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and >> duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must >> have duration in the emergent sense and must overlap. But their relation >> to the UD threads is more aspirational than proven. >> > I think it should be possible to pause and restart at any point a process > underpinning consciousness and leave the stream of consciousness unchanged; > otherwise there would be a radical decoupling of the mental from the > physical. At the limit, this means the process underpinning consciousness > can be cut up into infinitesimals. > > > Infinitesimals, I think not, at least not in Bruno's model. Each thread > of the UD's computation can be cut and restarted, but underlying an > "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is > no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time". > So they make the "time" of consciousness essentially real valued. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > topic/everything-list/FnHZFBf-Acw/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.