On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 10:50:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Hi, > > Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of the > moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations? > > > > Duration and moment are more like Bergson-Brouwer 1p notion. It emerges in > the 1p statistics on all relative computations. > I guess a moment might be well approximated there by an open set in some > topological space, probably through the semantics of the machine first > person theories (S4Grz(1), X1*). > > To have the notion of computation, and the computations per se, we need > only the digital clock given by the successor operation, and (at a > different level) from the induction axioms (for the machine who want prove > things about the computations). > > Bruno >
Ahaa! So it is the monkey typing randomly that creates everything. But where does he/it get the clock and the notion of a successor element? God given? AG > > > > > > > > On Saturday, August 27, 2016 at 7:44:16 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: >> >> On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 11:38 PM, Charles Goodwin <crg...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things >> with >> > Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I think >> (from >> > memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help? >> > >> > I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor" and so on. At step 7 we reach the point >> where >> > we assume that a physical Universal Dovetailer can be created and that >> it >> > runs forever, and ask what is the probability that my observer moments >> are >> > generated by it, rather than by my brain. >> > >> > Now ISTM that the UD will have an infinite number of possible >> programmes to >> > run, so even if it runs forever, how does it get on to the second step >> in >> > any of them? >> >> Every program can be mapped to a natural number (intuitively, imagine >> the binary encoding of a program in any Turing-complete language). >> With something akin to the binary encoding (more abstractly, you can >> do this to the state table of a Universal Turing Machine), program >> size increases with their numbers. >> >> Then the dovetailer proceeds like so: >> >> - execute step 1 of program 1 >> - execute step 2 of program 1 >> - execute step 1 of program 2 >> - execute step 3 of program 1 >> - execute step 2 of program 2 >> - execute step 1 of program 3 >> ... >> >> So it will only take finite time for all the computable programs of up >> to a certain size to finish. >> >> Telmo. >> >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> an >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.