On 11 Sep 2016, at 19:23, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 10:50:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 10 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi,
Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time
of the moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations?
Duration and moment are more like Bergson-Brouwer 1p notion. It
emerges in the 1p statistics on all relative computations.
I guess a moment might be well approximated there by an open set in
some topological space, probably through the semantics of the
machine first person theories (S4Grz(1), X1*).
To have the notion of computation, and the computations per se, we
need only the digital clock given by the successor operation, and
(at a different level) from the induction axioms (for the machine
who want prove things about the computations).
Bruno
Ahaa! So it is the monkey typing randomly that creates everything.
But where does he/it get the clock and the notion of a successor
element? God given? AG
It follows from the assumption, which are part of what all scientists
assume. Precisely, everything follows from the following axioms (with
digital mechanism assumed at the metalevel---that *is* the result):
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)
x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1
x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x
That is not obvious, note. But, I insist, the UD has nothing to do
with the typing monkey. You get the Monkey already with
0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1)) -> x = y
which is not Turing Universal. To get the computations, you need
addition and multiplication. The rest is elementary theoretical
computer science. See the book by Davis, or Boolos-and-Jeffrey.
If you can explain how a Turing universal machine/number can
distinguish introspectively (without doing measurement) the
arithmetical reality from any reality invoking a transcendent notion
(like Primary Matter), it is up to you to solve the paradoxes of being
both Turing emulable, and using something not Turing emulable. The
step 8 shows that this is logically impossible. This is not done in
the sane04 paper, see:
Bruno Marchal. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body
problem, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, Volume 113,
Issue 1, September 2013, Pages 127–140
Bruno
On Saturday, August 27, 2016 at 7:44:16 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
wrote:
On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 11:38 PM, Charles Goodwin
<crg...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar
things with
> Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I
think (from
> memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help?
>
> I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor" and so on. At step 7 we reach the
point where
> we assume that a physical Universal Dovetailer can be created and
that it
> runs forever, and ask what is the probability that my observer
moments are
> generated by it, rather than by my brain.
>
> Now ISTM that the UD will have an infinite number of possible
programmes to
> run, so even if it runs forever, how does it get on to the second
step in
> any of them?
Every program can be mapped to a natural number (intuitively, imagine
the binary encoding of a program in any Turing-complete language).
With something akin to the binary encoding (more abstractly, you can
do this to the state table of a Universal Turing Machine), program
size increases with their numbers.
Then the dovetailer proceeds like so:
- execute step 1 of program 1
- execute step 2 of program 1
- execute step 1 of program 2
- execute step 3 of program 1
- execute step 2 of program 2
- execute step 1 of program 3
...
So it will only take finite time for all the computable programs of
up
to a certain size to finish.
Telmo.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-
list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
