On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the > outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public > part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable the decryption can > be completed only in terms of the private perspective of *the system in > question*. This then inevitably entails that decrypted messages of this > kind must be inter-subjectively incommunicable despite the ultimate irony > that they amount to the entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete > reality. It is of course in this sense also that the brain is secondary to > consciousness: i.e. that self-referential perceptual apprehension is the > filter through which a concrete reality, with all its brains and bodies, is > enabled in the first place to emerge (and I do mean emerge in a strong > sense). That primary "grasp on reality" is what enables any subsequent > abstract analysis in terms of a reductive "bottom up" physical mechanism > playing the role of a locally-dominating computational mechanism (or IOW > what you have termed the reversal of physics and machine psychology). > But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual apprehension"? Bruno says that the physical world in not computed, the way some people speculate that "we are a simulation", but only thoughts are computed and the physical world is inferred. Yes of course, but it's that very "inference" in the first person perspective that unavoidably must present as perceptual apprehension before it can be abstracted to any other level of analysis. The point I've been making (which goodness knows is hardly novel in these discussions) is that the existence of self-reflexive computations But that's the point I'm questioning. Bruno notes that an algorithmic machine can prove somethings about itself. But is this what we refer to as perception? I don't think so. Perception includes and inference or construction of the thing perceived. In case of a declarative sentence it may be a proposition about something, e.g. "There's no chair in this room." or "That sentence contradicts one of the axioms I assumed." But perception can be mistaken. Can proofs be mistaken? Yes, just as a syllogism can be both sound on the basis of its premises and yet false in its real world conclusions. However, I think you place too much weight at such an early stage on the fine detail of the relation between proof, belief and truth, which cannot at this point be more than illustrative. The more important thing to grasp IMO is the categorical distinction between 3p and 1p systems of logic. This is plausibly sufficient to suggest, or at least not rule out, how computation might support perception in the sense of a non-analytic reference to something entangled with, but transcending, formal proofs. is what permits the emulation of an internal or subjective logic in terms of which there can be precisely this direct apprehension (a term etymologically related to grasping) of a concrete perceptual reality. And the logical cost of any denial that such apprehension is veridical (as, at least at face value, in the case of Churchland or Dennett) must be the loss not only of such concrete perception in itself (and no, this conjunction of concrete and perceptual isn't a contradiction), but also the entire sense of any purported utterance that could otherwise be understood as referring to it. So any instance of optical illusion entails the "logical cost" of "entire sense of any purported utterance that could otherwise be understood as referring to it." Hence it is impossible to describe an optical illusion, such as Escher's staircase which closes on itself but gives the illusion of always ascending counterclockwise and descending clockwise. How many times have we gone around the block of this particular misunderstanding? I apologise for any continuing failing in clarity on my part, but do I really need to make the distinction yet again between the primary apprehension of a percept, without which nothing can follow, and any subsequent inference from it, whether accurate or mistaken? This is as applicable to an "illusion" as to any purportedly accurate perception, a distinction that, whereas it appears systematically to elude the likes of Dennett, I had hoped was not lost on yourself. I agree that the physical world is inferred from those perceptions that have point-of-view-invariance as my friend Vic Stenger called it. But I don't see how a POVI subset of UD computations can just be picked out by some anthropic principle. ISTM they must have some computed unity independent of conscious thoughts (which must be a subset of zero measure). Yes indeed, but don't you have it backwards here? Surely it's rather that a POVI non-zero subset of reflexive UD computations is hypothesised to pick out a physical world in which it is itself embedded. No. In fact the significance of symmetry laws was not understood as basic to physics until the 20th century. You may say they were hypothesized, but many such hypotheses turned out to be false. Finding the ones that are true is empirical and uncertain...not relations characteristic of mathematical proofs. So how are proofs good models of perceptions or beliefs, reflexive or otherwise? But that the FPI serves to pick out of the operationally correct "theory" is central to the comp assumption. Indeed isn't something not dissimilar implicated in any theory that involves observer selection? Perhaps you would prefer to use some approach that doesn't involve proofs or reflexivity, but whatever that might be it would have to be emulable in computation, else comp is false. In any case, I think you may be missing something crucially important by putting so much weight on proof per se as opposed to the distinction between its sub-types. The point of my OP was in fact to point to the centrality of the 3p/1p logical distinction to everything that follows. Miss that and you will miss everything, I fear. See below. That's implicit in the comp theory. But I don't think comp theory is proven - so it cannot be cited in support of what is implicit in it. One of it's failings seems to be that there is far too much implicit in it. Yes of course it can, by assumption, until proven false. As to the scope of its implicit content, that's pretty much inevitable in a potential TOE, wouldn't you say? And note that this physical world is in the first instance apprehended (perceived, grasped) as a concrete percept. Any other level of analysis can only ever be a secondary inference from this primary apprehension. But that's not the neo-platonist way. Bruno assumes that "primary apprehension" is belief in arithmetic...not chairs. Not belief *in* arithmetic but belief as modelled in arithmetic. And my point is that if, instead of this, you jump ahead to the point at which the "physical computation" is already independently I didn't make any jump. You, one, whatever. I didn't mean it personally, although admittedly I would be surprised if you yourself balked at extrapolating consciousness from physics. assumed (aka primitive) there can be no further a priori need for any hypothesis of subjectivity That's exactly contrary to Bruno's claim that physics cannot explain subjectivity; so it would have to arise from some extra-material hypothesis. I don't know what you thought I was saying, but to be clear I mean simply that the assumption of a primitive (unexplained) physical mechanism does not require a selective role for - and hence should eschew any a priori posit of - the supernumerary hypothesis of subjectivity or for that matter a concrete perceptual reality. AFAICT, that is entirely compatible with Bruno's position. or for that matter any concrete perceptual reality that might accompany it. A self-sustaining bottom-up-all-the-way-down ??? Reductive, without necessary recourse to strong emergence. You disagree? physical mechanism can have no principled rationale for such baroque supplementary hypotheses. Computation, by contrast, unavoidably implies precisely the contrary. Computation implies the contrary of "a self-sustaining bottom-up-all-the-way-down physical mechanism can have no principled rationale"...which I parse as saying that ""a self-sustaining bottom-up-all-the-way-down physical mechanism can have a principled rationale" Is that what you meant?? I'm sorry but I can't parse an intelligble question out of this. Or are you saying computationalism implies the need for an hypothesis of subjectivity?Bruno seems to claim that subjectivity is implicit in computationalism because some propositions about an axiomatic system can be proven within it. But of course comp implies the need for an hypothesis of subjectivity. We've been discussing this for years. The comp assumption relies on observer selection as the essential filter for discriminating physics (aka the subset of computation in which subjectivity is hypothesised to be embedded) from non-physics. It's the notorious reversal of physics and machine psychology (i.e. in explanatory priority). And I don't think what you say about Bruno's position is accurate. IIUC, he claims that subjectivity is implied by comp because of the existence of computable logics with the categorically distinct public/private characteristics of a knower. This is the crucial point of departure for knowledge of incommunicable concrete (as distinct from communicable analytic) percepts. The centrality of the 3p/1p distinction cannot be avoided here, else incomprehension will simply be interminable. By the way, I think Dennett gets this at some level, which is why he does his dogmatic damnedest, even at the cost of resorting to the frankly nonsensical, to deny any privacy whatsoever to the first person perspective. But that's no more proof of subjectivity than saying a physical system has a point-of-view. Hence that is one of its chief recommendations for evaluation as a TOE. Of course you are right that, in terms of the computational ontology assumed at the outset, this hypothesised subset must be evaluated independently of the conscious thought to which it is supposed to give rise. Which is why I said that a computed world must include the computed physics which gives meaning to computed perceptions being "shared", i.e. POVI. But Bruno seemed to reject this. Not at all. Unless I'm very much deluded, that's exactly what he claims. It's just that "world" here must be understood as the intersection of inummerable computational histories mediated by FPI. David Brent And it is an open problem whether such a subset is indeed most plausibly encapsulated within the kind of consistent quantum-logical physical mechanism that we take to underlie our shared perceptual reality. This question of course lies at the heart of the whole enterprise. Its plausibility must be evaluated, amongst other considerations, with respect to computational relative measure in the face of the entire trace of the UD, the complexities of which I confess I am incompetent to assess. David Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
