On 08 Apr 2017, at 05:10, David Nyman wrote:
On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from
the outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas
the public part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable
the decryption can be completed only in terms of the private
perspective of *the system in question*. This then inevitably
entails that decrypted messages of this kind must be inter-
subjectively incommunicable despite the ultimate irony that they
amount to the entirety of inter-subjectively "shareable" concrete
reality. It is of course in this sense also that the brain is
secondary to consciousness: i.e. that self-referential perceptual
apprehension is the filter through which a concrete reality, with
all its brains and bodies, is enabled in the first place to emerge
(and I do mean emerge in a strong sense). That primary "grasp on
reality" is what enables any subsequent abstract analysis in terms
of a reductive "bottom up" physical mechanism playing the role of a
locally-dominating computational mechanism (or IOW what you have
termed the reversal of physics and machine psychology).
But what, in the computations of the UD, is "perceptual
apprehension"? Bruno says that the physical world in not computed,
the way some people speculate that "we are a simulation", but only
thoughts are computed and the physical world is inferred.
Yes of course, but it's that very "inference" in the first person
perspective that unavoidably must present as perceptual
apprehension before it can be abstracted to any other level of
analysis. The point I've been making (which goodness knows is
hardly novel in these discussions) is that the existence of self-
reflexive computations
But that's the point I'm questioning. Bruno notes that an
algorithmic machine can prove somethings about itself. But is this
what we refer to as perception? I don't think so. Perception
includes and inference or construction of the thing perceived. In
case of a declarative sentence it may be a proposition about
something, e.g. "There's no chair in this room." or "That sentence
contradicts one of the axioms I assumed." But perception can be
mistaken. Can proofs be mistaken?
Yes, just as a syllogism can be both sound on the basis of its
premises and yet false in its real world conclusions. However, I
think you place too much weight at such an early stage on the fine
detail of the relation between proof, belief and truth, which cannot
at this point be more than illustrative. The more important thing to
grasp IMO is the categorical distinction between 3p and 1p systems
of logic. This is plausibly sufficient to suggest, or at least not
rule out, how computation might support perception in the sense of a
non-analytic reference to something entangled with, but
transcending, formal proofs.
Which what you get in all the points of view with "& p", like []p &
p, and []p & <>t & p. It transcends the formal. it cannot be defined
by a number.
Perception is when you get an input "important enough" to put in your
short term memory. It is a (local) new axiom; usually encoded
associatively in the brain. It is still a self-reference, but usually
accompanied by a theory of what is plausibly/probably the source: like
saying "it is a bee". "it is Moscow". The "<>t" added in some points
of view is the "implicit" assumption that there is a reality/source
responsible for my perceptions, but the machine can hardly know what
that is at the start, if ever. It is a bit an unconscious hope of self-
consistency. When getting conscious it either makes us more powerful
in probability abilities, but then we change and become a different
machine, with an extended belief system, or it makes us inconsistent,
in case the new axiom is too strong. Here an axiom can be a stable
neural pattern. It does not need to be a sentence in some formal
language, but it is still 3p and representational, unlike the
(distributed) first person (flux) which differentiates on those
relative representations.
Bruno
is what permits the emulation of an internal or subjective logic in
terms of which there can be precisely this direct apprehension (a
term etymologically related to grasping) of a concrete perceptual
reality. And the logical cost of any denial that such apprehension
is veridical (as, at least at face value, in the case of Churchland
or Dennett) must be the loss not only of such concrete perception
in itself (and no, this conjunction of concrete and perceptual
isn't a contradiction), but also the entire sense of any purported
utterance that could otherwise be understood as referring to it.
So any instance of optical illusion entails the "logical cost" of
"entire sense of any purported utterance that could otherwise be
understood as referring to it." Hence it is impossible to describe
an optical illusion, such as Escher's staircase which closes on
itself but gives the illusion of always ascending counterclockwise
and descending clockwise.
How many times have we gone around the block of this particular
misunderstanding? I apologise for any continuing failing in clarity
on my part, but do I really need to make the distinction yet again
between the primary apprehension of a percept, without which nothing
can follow, and any subsequent inference from it, whether accurate
or mistaken? This is as applicable to an "illusion" as to any
purportedly accurate perception, a distinction that, whereas it
appears systematically to elude the likes of Dennett, I had hoped
was not lost on yourself.
I agree that the physical world is inferred from those perceptions
that have point-of-view-invariance as my friend Vic Stenger called
it. But I don't see how a POVI subset of UD computations can just
be picked out by some anthropic principle. ISTM they must have
some computed unity independent of conscious thoughts (which must
be a subset of zero measure).
Yes indeed, but don't you have it backwards here? Surely it's
rather that a POVI non-zero subset of reflexive UD computations is
hypothesised to pick out a physical world in which it is itself
embedded.
No. In fact the significance of symmetry laws was not understood as
basic to physics until the 20th century. You may say they were
hypothesized, but many such hypotheses turned out to be false.
Finding the ones that are true is empirical and uncertain...not
relations characteristic of mathematical proofs. So how are proofs
good models of perceptions or beliefs, reflexive or otherwise?
But that the FPI serves to pick out of the operationally correct
"theory" is central to the comp assumption. Indeed isn't something
not dissimilar implicated in any theory that involves observer
selection? Perhaps you would prefer to use some approach that
doesn't involve proofs or reflexivity, but whatever that might be it
would have to be emulable in computation, else comp is false. In any
case, I think you may be missing something crucially important by
putting so much weight on proof per se as opposed to the distinction
between its sub-types. The point of my OP was in fact to point to
the centrality of the 3p/1p logical distinction to everything that
follows. Miss that and you will miss everything, I fear. See below.
That's implicit in the comp theory.
But I don't think comp theory is proven - so it cannot be cited in
support of what is implicit in it. One of it's failings seems to be
that there is far too much implicit in it.
Yes of course it can, by assumption, until proven false. As to the
scope of its implicit content, that's pretty much inevitable in a
potential TOE, wouldn't you say?
And note that this physical world is in the first instance
apprehended (perceived, grasped) as a concrete percept.
Any other level of analysis can only ever be a secondary inference
from this primary apprehension.
But that's not the neo-platonist way. Bruno assumes that "primary
apprehension" is belief in arithmetic...not chairs.
Not belief *in* arithmetic but belief as modelled in arithmetic.
And my point is that if, instead of this, you jump ahead to the
point at which the "physical computation" is already independently
I didn't make any jump.
You, one, whatever. I didn't mean it personally, although admittedly
I would be surprised if you yourself balked at extrapolating
consciousness from physics.
assumed (aka primitive) there can be no further a priori need for
any hypothesis of subjectivity
That's exactly contrary to Bruno's claim that physics cannot explain
subjectivity; so it would have to arise from some extra-material
hypothesis.
I don't know what you thought I was saying, but to be clear I mean
simply that the assumption of a primitive (unexplained) physical
mechanism does not require a selective role for - and hence should
eschew any a priori posit of - the supernumerary hypothesis of
subjectivity or for that matter a concrete perceptual reality.
AFAICT, that is entirely compatible with Bruno's position.
or for that matter any concrete perceptual reality that might
accompany it. A self-sustaining bottom-up-all-the-way-down
???
Reductive, without necessary recourse to strong emergence. You
disagree?
physical mechanism can have no principled rationale for such
baroque supplementary hypotheses. Computation, by contrast,
unavoidably implies precisely the contrary.
Computation implies the contrary of "a self-sustaining bottom-up-
all-the-way-down physical mechanism can have no principled
rationale"...which I parse as saying that ""a self-sustaining
bottom-up-all-the-way-down physical mechanism can have a principled
rationale" Is that what you meant??
I'm sorry but I can't parse an intelligble question out of this.
Or are you saying computationalism implies the need for an
hypothesis of subjectivity?Bruno
seems to claim that subjectivity is implicit in computationalism
because some propositions about an axiomatic system can be proven
within it.
But of course comp implies the need for an hypothesis of
subjectivity. We've been discussing this for years. The comp
assumption relies on observer selection as the essential filter for
discriminating physics (aka the subset of computation in which
subjectivity is hypothesised to be embedded) from non-physics. It's
the notorious reversal of physics and machine psychology (i.e. in
explanatory priority). And I don't think what you say about Bruno's
position is accurate. IIUC, he claims that subjectivity is implied
by comp because of the existence of computable logics with the
categorically distinct public/private characteristics of a knower.
This is the crucial point of departure for knowledge of
incommunicable concrete (as distinct from communicable analytic)
percepts. The centrality of the 3p/1p distinction cannot be avoided
here, else incomprehension will simply be interminable. By the way,
I think Dennett gets this at some level, which is why he does his
dogmatic damnedest, even at the cost of resorting to the frankly
nonsensical, to deny any privacy whatsoever to the first person
perspective.
But that's no more proof of subjectivity than saying a physical
system has a point-of-view.
Hence that is one of its chief recommendations for evaluation as a
TOE.
Of course you are right that, in terms of the computational
ontology assumed at the outset, this hypothesised subset must be
evaluated independently of the conscious thought to which it is
supposed to give rise.
Which is why I said that a computed world must include the computed
physics which gives meaning to computed perceptions being
"shared", i.e. POVI. But Bruno seemed to reject this.
Not at all. Unless I'm very much deluded, that's exactly what he
claims. It's just that "world" here must be understood as the
intersection of inummerable computational histories mediated by FPI.
David
Brent
And it is an open problem whether such a subset is indeed most
plausibly encapsulated within the kind of consistent quantum-
logical physical mechanism that we take to underlie our shared
perceptual reality. This question of course lies at the heart of
the whole enterprise. Its plausibility must be evaluated, amongst
other considerations, with respect to computational relative
measure in the face of the entire trace of the UD, the complexities
of which I confess I am incompetent to assess.
David
Brent
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