On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I get your point with decoherence.
Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What
does
mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling
with
the environment prevents the current observer state to become
compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that
such
certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I
cannot
disprove, but find problematic).
It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP.
But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T-
rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the
T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the
particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just
completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the
past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid.
I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is
more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in
principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that
information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as
less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information
goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and
returned to the original interaction.
In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special
relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have
agreed to disagree on this if I remember well).
Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR
does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have
a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because
of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not
removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say.
I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some
vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to
people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits
that information, they need to come into contact.
Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in
principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible.
OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM)
Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of
information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is
possible in special circumstances, but not in general.
From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is
assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the
word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved.
In QM + SR. OK.
Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which
recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the
uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs,
simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the
decoherent history remains unique.
OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past
in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle,
or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that
a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c).
That makes sense.
Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows
superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness".
I agree. Both "linearities" (the quantum evolution, and the tensor
products).
FWIW, you
are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can
be no
superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead
and live cats,
because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic
objects.
Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems
isolated from
interaction with their environment, which is why quantum
computers are so
fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated
from
interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially
more
difficult as the system grows in size.
The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different
observer states, if they differ only by things that are not
observable?
I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the
things not observed, even when observable.
I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz.,
two fully decohered branches will hold different observer states,
even if the differences are not observed or observable. So if some
trivial physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of
a K 40 nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even
particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such
an event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one
in which the decay has occurred, and one in which it has not. And
since this is a beta decay, a neutrino is lost along the light
cone in every case of decay. Perfect recombination of the branches
is, then, according to the above argument, not possible. You might
object that this decay in my toe did not alter my conscious state
-- that is correct, but there are now two copies of the Moscow man
as in step 3,
My mistake here - I misremembered step 3. Moscow is a target, not
the origin. I should have said two copies of the Helsinki man.
But those state difference are accessible to the observers, and
indeed, only this makes the analogy with step 3 working.
In MWI, the differences are not observable by anyone. Any observer
has access to only one branch, so only one copy. They can say
nothing about the other branch.
The difference are not observable, but are very gross, like seeing a
cat dead, or alive. Linearity prevent any direct view of that
difference, but it exists, when we assume QM (and non collapse).
With computationalism, the two identical states at the correct
susbt-level, if never distinguishable, will not add ways to the
probabilities (that would entail that a computer with double cable
would have a higher probability). The measure remains on the first
person view, which eventually needs the self-referential
definition. usually I just say that if in step 3 you add a
reconsitution box in Moscow, exactly identical, the P(W) remains
equal to 1/2, but a slight difference in the future histories of
the two guy in Moscow, will changes the probability into 1/3 (but
that is a typical open problem).
I suspect that this follows from my mistake about which man was
duplicated. I did not mean that there was a duplication *after* the
initial formation of two branches.
and these can evolve in different directions while each remains
unaware of the existence of the other. They can never recombine
and compare diaries!
OK.
But this has to be tempered by the fact that any interaction will
count as an observation, making super-exponentially hard to
indeed recover a macroscopic superposition in the past, even the
very close past. Of course, that might change the day we succeed
in building a fault tolerant (topological perhaps) quantum
computer.
That will not help in the general case. Our future quantum
computer might be able to delay decoherence for some useful finite
time, but that still only retaines the superposition in the said
computer, it does not help with recombination of decohered
branches in general.
In general no. But I was in a thought experiment in classical QM,
with some T-rex having isolated a quantum qubit.
Unfortunately, the T-rex missed them. yet, if a T-rex made a
solid topological quantum qubit, in the state 0+1, we would have
a past with 0, and a past with 1, as long as we don't look at it.
I read, already a long time ago, some experimental evidence of
temporal Bell's inequality going in this direction, and I think
we don't even need to test them, as we get them with the usual
Bell's inequality violation, if we accept special relativity (and
some amount of physical realism (not the full materialism, to be
sure).
The temporal version of Bell's inequality simply shows that the
ubiquitous non-locality of quantum entanglement occurs even over
time. And despite your protestations to the contrary, it is now
generally accepted that MWI does not remove the essential non-
locality associated with entangled states.
Of course, it assures them in all branches, where indeed Aspect
like experiences can be made. It seems to me that we did agree on
this: that non-locality does not entail any physical influence in
the past. That does happen in the unique universe view though; even
if there is no possible communication of information is done.
Non-locality means that there is no physical transfer of
information, but that there is non-physical(non-local) transfer of
information. But this information transfer cannot be used for
signalling. Signalling is possible only with actual; physical
transfer, a consequence of SR and the fact that 'information' is
physical.
So we agree. Yet, with unicity of outcomes assumed for measurement, we
still cannot signal, but must assume some "reduction of a wave packet
at a distance", or super-deterministic conspiracies.
This non-locality is even more evident in the more recent delayed
choice experiments that use entangled photons to manipulate photon
polarization states non-locally.
I have no problem with one-branch observable, apparent, non-locality.
I have a problem only with the action at a distance that you need
in case you assume one contextually well defined physical reality.
Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe.
In the sense above, you are right. I was juste arguing against John
Clarks idea that the Bell's inequality violation introduce physical
action at a distance, even with the MWI.
There are two things:
1) no influence at a distance,
2) no signaling at a distance.
With QM-without collapse, there is no influence at a distance. The no-
locality above is explained without them.
With QM+ collapse, there is no signaling at a distance, but there is
an influence at a distance.
For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR
"paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our
belonging to macrosuperposition.
The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without
collapse.
I know some claims this, but I have never sen a proof. All proofs
relies on unicity of the outcome of some experiences.
As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to
demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem
- all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is
what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any
other interpretation.
We did eventually agree. May be reread those post. Bell's supposed
that when the two measurement are done, Alice and Bob get a precise
answer, which makes no sense without-collapse. Alice and Bob get *all*
(always correlated) answers, but when light-separated, it make no
sense to compare them. They can only make comparison with the person
accessible in their light cone, where the contagious superposition
spread out.
Bruno
Bruce
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