On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: <snip>
On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or
in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's
the reversal.
Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for
"object".
Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little
too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-
winded :(
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects, as
physics becomes a first person plural notion.
Exactly
But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely
many computations which supports its self-referential modes.
Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or
epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true)
in terms of a point-of-view.
OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only
a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even
express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the
correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the
arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1
complete set.
That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove
the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or
not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that
the induction axioms are "viciously" circular,
Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection
of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation
was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be
something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us
select these features as data, which then might lead us to the
following conclusion...etc.".
I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen
as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also
the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is
something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of
much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory
than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).
We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,
but that would be a bit ad hoc,
Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the
mind of the inner God-subject.
How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is
like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at
itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through
the Bp window.
Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I
assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or
perceptual object.
I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.
I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the
provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view
coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the
fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But
that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first
person subject.
Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least
heuristically) with monopsychism.
OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V,
is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably
already in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs".
Quantified G*, qG*, is PI-complete in the V oracle. So, even if
you have V at your disposition, you need to complete an infinite
task, with infinitely "prayers" to V, to decide a general question
(having quantifiers) on qG*. The god of mechanism is less rich and
less complete than the "world of ideas" of mechanism. That is
perhaps why Plato missed that God, and why Plotinus added it.
A simple, if rough, analogy might be the relation between the
mechanism of a DVD player and the spectrum of possible movies it
is capable of instantiating (assuming also an infinite collection
of discs and a suitable extrinsic interpretation). The DVD Library
of Babel, if you like. It would be impossible in principle to
predict the movies as experienced purely on the basis of the
mechanism involved in the encoding /decoding process. Generalising
to include the implicit observer, truth is then consequent on a
reflexive or intrinsic notion of self-interpretation. So it is, in
an epistemological sense, emergent from mechanism, though not in
any objective sense mechanistically predictable. ISTM that these
general principles lie at the core of the notions of origins and
creativity necessarily implicit in the 'mechanistic TOE'.
I think so, but that is why at some point we have to rely to the
theory of self-reference of the universal numbers. It is not a
coincidence why post used the term "creative".
Yet this needs to assume some truth, as independent of all
observers, machines, numbers (except God, but God is arithmetical
truth, in this context, and neither "God", nor the term "truth"
names it genuinely).
Whatever it might be named it cannot coherently be doubted if
mechanism is to make sense, as indeed you say below. If it had a
name it might be the "indubitable" .
I would say that only my consciousness here and now is indubitable.
That is the inner god. You are right in the sense that "It" too has
no name and no description (Bp & p is unaware of Bp, somehow, and
does not recognize itself in any possible "Bp").
The outer god of comp is dubitable. We can only scratch the surface,
and, the humans already fight on how to interpret the tiny dust that
they extract from the scratching.
I guess you meant the Inner God,
Yes
but beware the "blaspheme" (G* minus G propositions): "inner God =
outer god".
Only the outer God can equate the inner God with the outer God,.
Yes, but doesn't the comp theory itself assume the relation as if
true, in order for mechanism to make sense (which was my caveat)?
The point here is very subtle. We cannot assume Mechanism is true, we
can only assume Mechanism. We can assume it as a sort of meta-level
hypothesis. It is indeed the reason why I insist on an act of faith,
and why it is a theology.
Now, you might ask me what is the difference between assuming X, and
assuming X is true. The difference is that when we assume X, but don't
invoke the full semantic of X, and we can preserve our consistency. By
saying "mechanism is true", even in an hypothesis, you refer to the
God of mechanism at a place that is impossible.
We have something similar, but slightly simpler, for the notion of
self-consistency. Take PA. It has 6 axioms + the infinity of induction
axioms
1) Ax (0 ≠ s(x))
2) AxAy (s(x) = s(y) -> x = y)
3) Ax (x+0 = x)
4) AxAy (x+s(y) = s(x+y))
5) Ax (x*0=0)
6) AxAy (x*s(y)=(x*y)+x)
7) the infinity) (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x)))) -> AxF(x)
PA is consistent (I hope you are OK with this, as all mathematicians
are, except nelson)
Imagine I add to PA the axiom 8) PA is consistent. That is
8) consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7)
In that case there is no problem that new theory, PA+con(PA) is
consistent, and even much more powerful than PA. It proves new
theorems and it shorten many proofs.
But imagine we add the following to PA
8') consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8')
That is self-referential, but using the diagonal lemma (the D'X' =
'X'X'' trick), we can build that formula in arithmetic and add it to
PA as axiom.
In that case, we get a theory which can prove, indeed in one line
proof, its own consistency, and so, by Gödel II, that theory is
inconsistent.
The case above is more complex to describe, because it refers to
"arithmetical truth", which cannot even be defined in arithmetic. It
is almost the nuance between (Bp & p), and (Bp & V(p)). For each
partuclar p, you can write Bp & p, but you cannot define knowledge by
a general (Bx & x). It is the nuance between assuming that x + 0 = x,
and using only that, and assuming True('x + 0 = x'), which cannot be
express in the arithmetical language.
Mechanism is awkward on this. Yet, this ustains your intution that the
ultimate 3p, the outer God view, is a 0p pov. It works well with
Plotinus idea that God does not exist, as it is the ultimate reason
why everything exists without mentioning ever itself in the creation
(making the idea that God can talk with us in a direct public way non
sensical). Only the first person has access to this, but can only stay
mute. Another example is that even if someone survives the classical
teleportation experience, he/she cannot claim that he/she knows that
mechanism is true. Still another example, even closer to what is
alluded above is the case of the notion of sigma_1 truth, or simply
sigma-truth. The notion of sigma-truth *is* definable in arithmetic,
and the self-referential sentences saying that she is sigma-true
appears to be a sigma proposition, yet it can be shown to be ...
false! This is very unlike the sigma proposition saying "I am
provable", which is always true! All this despite G* proves (sigma-
true <-> sigma provable), but again, only G* says this, the machine
has to be mute.
I cannot say "if mechanism is true then the truth of mechanism go
without saying", but I can say at the meta-level "If mechanism then
the truth of mechanism go without saying". I think.
(I fall myself in that trap often, but *sometimes* it is just to avoid
nuances which at some stage is a bit like a 1004 mistake with respect
to beginners ...). In our context, I told you that we are always close
to inconsistency. You seem to like the panorama we can get from
climbing a very high cliff.
Bruno
PS I will be absent for the next days.
David
We can do that, at some meta-level, referring explicitly to
mechanism, but not experientially (although salvia might disagree on
this). The inner God cannot, even if he tends to do that all the
times, but then that is (plausibly) why the "souls fall and matter
appears".
Bruno
David
Now, even that truth is partially accessible only to the first
person. That's why God invented it, to talk poetically, as such
truth are supposed to be absolute for mechanism making sense.
Bruno
David
So, I would say that they are in the mind of the outer God
In what sense is the outer-God conceptualised as possessing a
'mind'? Do you simply mean perception in some generic sense
before symmetry is broken?
The outer God is the Truth "predicate" (the one that the machine
cannot define unless she invoke a bigger God). You can see it as a
person by identifying the outer-God with a putative mind knowing,
or believing, all (and only all) arithmetical truth.
My habit is to keep "perception" for the physical realm. I prefer
to say that I do not perceive a number, but that I only conceive
it, or believe in it, even when I close my eyes. The reason is
that I want to avoid the idea that number are physical objects.
Eventually, there will be no physical object at all, but physical
sensations, explained by (infinities) of number relations.
OK
, and the inner God is the outer God becoming amnesic, and "lost"
in the belief that he is PA, or that number on the hard disk of
the doctor.
Yes, as above.
On this, the math are difficult, and I assume fully the "galois
connection", with consciousness side with the semantic, that is
the G, <>t, by the completeness theorem. Eventually, and to be
short, consciousness sides with p, making Bp, the brain/machine/
theory/formula restricting consciousness.
The problem with this is that it makes a butterfly more conscious
than a human. Little mind have more possibilities, and a far
bigger set of consistent extensions, and consciousness reflects
that spectrum ignorance. I don't know, I find that weird.
Well, in a monopsychic sense the 'roots' of consciousness, in
the generic, virgin machine, are perhaps very deep. So if the
brain/body somehow 'filters' perception then perhaps, the less
constriction, the less consequent impedance, at least to some
limit. The doors of perception perhaps open a bit wider. I don't
know either, but it might make some sort of sense.
Less restriction? I guess so. Plotinus want the ONE to be simple.
I can think of it as being a person, or a thing. It might defines
more restricted notion of God, which could make more sense for
people having had a religious education. There is room for debate,
but in the mind-body problem, those consideration are irrelevant,
as we use only the points of view available by the machine, and
this requires always the "[]p (& #)".
I should perhaps insist that I identify a person with its set of
beliefs. Then you can associate a person to any subset of V,
including V. But a machine is characterized by the fact that its
subset of belief (or better: believable propositions) is (locally)
RE.
That's one of the reasons I find that particular heuristic
intuitively helpful. I guess it's my version of the Wittgenstein
ladder. But don't worry, I can always let go of it. I hope.
even if for the numbers+addition+multiplication, we can only
explains them by "God made them", in the sense that we cannot
recover them by assuming less than anything Turing equivalent
with them.
I can't think of anything less, offhand.
Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess,
Split away! It's hairs, by the way :)
Now, *you* are splitting the hairs.
Let me really split one hair. What could that give? I tell you
that it gives h and airs. h is the indivisible horse!
Oy veh :(
I was just using Occam :)
Don't cut yourself!
Oops ...
Bruno
David
Bruno
David
Bruno
such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of
experience in terms of that of a single type of psychological
agent. This is then the subjective filter that effectively
constrains stable, pervasive and thereby (crucially)
*consistently memorable* experiences from the rest of the
computational Babel. And the consequence of that subjective
filtration, in conjunction with the transformational
computation that effects that its very stabilisation, then
comprises the effective physics of the experiencer, with the
caveats already mentioned. So subject precedes object in
explaining the appearance of physics. That is the reversal.
And it is necessitated by the not inconsiderable
problem that the alternative explanatory order cannot help but
*omit the explanation of the experiencer and its experiences*.
or is it just a Church-Turing version of Tegmark, i.e.
replacing the equations of quantum field theory with some
computational sequences that have the same effect at the level
of our experience.
But why be so cavalier about "the level of our experience"?
It's that very level that is omitted or merely taken for
granted in the conventional explanatory order. Remember that
the point of departure for all this is the computational
theory of *mind*. Nonetheless, the price of the ticket turns
out to be a computational theory of everything. Should this
surprise us?
But it's not clear to me that it has *mind* as fundamental.
Mind is to be explained by relations of provability (which
doesn't seem very plausible - but maybe).
Well, mind here is explained in a sort of duality of
provability and truth, or externality and internality. The
internal or 'qualitative' aspect is captured both by its
incommunicability (as seen from the 'outside') and its
indubitability (as seen from the 'inside).
The fundamental stuff is all possible computations, or
arithmetic.
If so, in this characterisation there would indeed be an
explanatory reversal between physics and the psychology of
the machine, as Bruno phrases it.
Fine, if it actually explained something instead of saying "If
this theory is correct there must be an explanation in terms
of UD computational threads."
I think you're being excessively demanding at this stage. The
reversal is already a startling change in explanatory
perspective. If it bears out, it can lead to a complete
reformulation, not of the mind-body problem in isolation, but
of the entire problem of origin and creativity. If one then
takes this in conjunction with the failure of the conventional
explanatory sequence to account in a non-question-begging
manner for the very possibility of there being an observable
reality in the first place, one can perhaps scrape together
sufficient motivation to maintain a modicum of interest.
The physical theory of cognition does explain some things -
like the effect of tequila on mathematical ability, why we
don't remember the future, why we love our children, etc.
Again you keep missing the hugely crucial point that your
characterisation above implicitly includes a privileged
extrinsic interpretation. It's this latter that I've called a
Wittgenstein ladder. It represents an artificial aid to
comprehension that must ultimately be let go if the final
explanation is not to beg the central question at issue. This
crucial question is of course that of *intrinsic*
interpretation. In the last analysis (which we cannot,
finally, ignore) no theory of perception can coherently rely
on interpretation from any perspective but that of the subject
itself. The vital matter of *your* experience cannot
ultimately be left to the mercy of *my* interpretation. Can it?
"Vital" and "left to the mercy" are just rhetorical flourishes.
I would have hoped nonetheless that my meaning was clearer to
you.
It may well be that third person accounts of you experience
my be possible.
But that's my whole point, don't you see? "Third person
accounts" always refers to an externalised interpretation in
terms of which *this can be said to be an account*. But the
point is that the final account is always an *internalised*,
first-person one of which the third-person version is merely a
description. IOW *my* subjectivity can't intelligibly depend
solely on *your* externalised description of it. And of course
vice versa.
Consider my AI Mars Rover example. It behaves with human
like intelligence - and it is generally agreed that a
philosophical zombie is impossible, hence the Mars Rover is
conscious.
That argument is a mere artifact of the way the definition is
formulated. It's simply saying that if consciousness is
considered to depend only on physical action then both we and
the Mars Rover must be considered conscious because our
physical actions are deemed to qualify in that respect.
And the engineers who designed its sensors and wrote its
programs will be able to give you a very good account of what
it is conscious of. What it's thoughts are on various
subjects. What answers it will be give to various questions.
Even how it would be affect by tequila. Of course you will
say, "Yes, but they won't know it's inner experience."
You're missing the point again. Which is that both the
engineers' accounts, and your own account of their accounts,
ultimately depend solely on internalised first-person
interpretations (i.e. theirs and yours). Your subsequent
description is then an attempt to make this interpretation
explicit in the third-person mode. But the first-person
interpretation is the lens through which all this is being
viewed (aka the Wittgenstein ladder). Since it's that very lens
we're trying to explain, you can't simply assume it in the
explanation. In effect, the account you give above eliminates
it from the explanans whilst implicitly retaining it in the
explanandum.
But Newton didn't know how gravity reached across empty
space. Einstein didn't know why stress-energy appears on the
RHS.
True, but if such an account were to be known or knowable it
would presumably be fully accountable in the third-person mode
without loss. Indeed isn't that what Einstein achieved with
respect to Newton's spooky action at a distance?
And Bruno doesn't know why some computations instantiate
experience and others don't, and which do which.
He won't ever know *why* because that's subsumed in the
assumption of CTM. But his aim, at least in a preliminary way,
on the basis of that assumption, is to suggest *how*, and in so
doing also make plausible what the logical limits of such an
account might consequently be.
The further point is that, if an everythingist approach is to
work, both the how and the why must in the end 'self-select'
from the dual plenitude of the ontological and epistemological
assumptions. I know you have a distaste for this mode of
explanation and indeed in the end it might never be made to
work. But as a conception it has a certain compelling quality;
at least it does for me. That's because, at least potentially,
it addresses core questions of origins and creativity without
assuming either. Everything that is, and everything that can be
performed or known, emerge in this view as the dumb extensional
consequences of an intensionally minimal widget, itself a
consequence of mere arithmetic. It's a conception of an
entirely ignorant but supremely productive creative process. To
that extent it might be said to out-Darwin Darwin.
I have suggested several times to Bruno questions related to
fundamental physics which it seems his theory might address,
e.g. why is QM based on complex Hilbert space instead of
quarteronic or octonic? Is the wave function ontic or
epistemic? But then he says his theory is just showing there's
a problem - not solving them.
Well give the poor guy a break why don't you? Open problems
are open to all. Why not give it a try yourself? That said, in
response to your question about the wavefunction, this bears
on the distinction I've recently been trying to draw between
the ontological and epistemological components of a general
theory. Inasmuch as the wavefunction is itself an inference
from the arithmetical ontology, in terms of my explanatory
scheme it is therefore an aspect of epistemology. IOW the
implication is that the physical organisation imposed on the
computational Babel by subjective filtration
'necessarily' (with the usual caveats here) takes the
mathematical form of the wavefunction.
That's the implication of a hope.
Indeed. But doesn't all speculation begin that way?
With an incidental historical appropriateness, this is
probably the view that Schrodinger himself might well have
taken, given his well known philosophical position.
Computationalism makes this characteristic of the physical a
little less surprising since the superposition of outcomes is
a direct consequence of the multiplicity of continuations
proceeding from any relative state.
No. The multiplicity is use to explain the probabilistic
nature of outcomes - or beliefs. But it doesn't explain
interference patterns that arise from superpositions.
You're right; my imprecision. What I meant of course is that
it would at least make the counterfactuality implied by MWI
plausible to that extent.
The question of relative measure of course remains open for
solution.
Of course there is an assumption here that the modes of
perception we are attempting to explain depend in some
critical way on just that physics whose phenomena we observe
and whose mathematical transformations we hypothesise. And
further that the measure of such a physics would typically
predominate over any other physics that might produce either
different modes of perception or a different spectrum of
'probabilities'. These are, to say the least. open problems
although as you are aware they have begun to figure even in
'conventional' physical speculation.
Yes, very open. It's a version of everything happens, and
that explains everything.
But this is the Everything List, so if not here where and if
not now when? Everythingism, in whatever form, seems in favour
at the moment as a general opening up of the possibilities of
explanation with a corresponding minimisation of the basic
entities and relations to be 'taken for granted'. As such, it
will either collapse into the theoretical graveyard as is the
fate of most such hypotheses or else emerge into the light as
a genuinely novel and fertile direction.
I know you're fond of the slogan that a theory that explains
everything actually succeeds in explaining nothing. But in
fact I think this is a misunderstanding of the original
aphorism. Its applicability is appropriate to a theory of
epicycles - psychoanalysis for example - in terms of which
there can be no counter-examples because new epicycles can
always be added to shore up the structure, no matter how
rickety it becomes. Bruno's approach isn't like that. It's
open to falsification by counter-example or contradiction at
any point. So aren't you still curious? Just a little?
Sure. That's why I've been on this list a long time. And I've
even offered to recommend Bruno for a Templeton - his
theological approach would really appeal to them.
Good idea.
David
Brent
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
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send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
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to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
