On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
> On 26/05/2017 8:44 pm, David Nyman wrote: > > On 26 May 2017 2:26 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> > bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > > On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote: > > On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < <meeke...@verizon.net> > meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > > > I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. "Invoke" is > a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an *inference *to > explain appearances (and a very successful one at that). > > > Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if > you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a > particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude. > And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they > really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of > 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected > for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how > those selfsame appearances come to be present to us? > > > I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I > understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation" > originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time > both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology > of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to > Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes > epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the > ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to > be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity > from this ontology. > > As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my > position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British > empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and > others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show > its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic > occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- > the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the > dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the > citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of > relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that > is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence, > "Epistemology precedes ontology". > > > Interesting analysis Bruce. However, I'm not sure if I can follow you on > all points. I think you're right that in a strictly pragmatic sense > epistemology does indeed precede ontology in that observation provides data > on behalf of theory. But as Popper points out, what counts as data is > already theory-dependent. > > > I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent. > Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face. What is data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in terms of another. This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I believe correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on which induction putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence primarily deductive. Conjecture and refutation is a better account of how science (or any consistent reasoning) actually proceeds. > But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting-edge > theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking..... > > > > And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly ontological > commitment. > Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific realists > would only claim that it is only for our best, well-established, theories > that there is any suggestion that the suggested entities actually exist. > But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely represents the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy. That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's "independent of us" simply because, although the basis of any explanation that follows, it doesn't itself rely on our explaining it. > > > So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent ontological > commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and unsatisfactory. > Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a hierarchical "Theory > of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, ontologically consistent > "bottom up all the way down", if you'll permit me a slogan of my own. > > > The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of > science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the negative > induction from the past record would not lead one to be optimistic that any > such theory exists or is possible. > > For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between Platonic > and Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. In practice, > *any* effective mode of explanation must inexorably be constrained by its > fundamental ontological commitments, > > > That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If explanation > does not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not constrained by any > such assumed ontology. Not all explanations need be reducible to your model > of explanation. > That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of falling into inconsistency. And so I can't agree that "my account" of a mutually-consistent reductive hierarchy of explanation is substantially different from what would generally be accepted, if only implicitly, as the ultimate aim of mechanistic explanation tout court. Whatever you say, it must be the case, in the final analysis, that the entire hierarchy of explanation must ultimately be reducible to a common set of ontological commitments or else risk frank inconsistency between its constituent elements. I should re-emphasise here that by ontology I mean merely those explanatory entities and relations that are in themselves not further explicated within the theory, but rather serve as the explanatory point of departure. Of course, you are perfectly correct that, pragmatically, no such fully-reducible hierarchy has yet been achieved. Indeed it is more than possible that it never will be. But I think it would nonetheless be an evasion to claim that ontological consistency isn't in a rather strong sense an underlying assumption of the scientific method itself. All modern science is implicitly based, as Bruno correctly points out, on a common assumption of mechanism, variously realised depending on whatever level of rigour and detail is achievable at any present state of the art (if you'll forgive the term). And that mechanistic assumption is in turn based implicitly on its reducibility to a "fundamental" or irreducible level (explanatorily speaking). This is true even in the case that any currently assumed such level is provisional, as indeed must always be the case, because we are speaking of explanatory consistency, not ultimate truth. Remember that the assumption of an arithmetical ontology in computationalism is likewise not presented as an ultimate truth but rather as the provisional basis for explanatory consistency in what follows. However, all that said, if your views are indeed as set out above, it's hardly surprising that you don't feel very compelled by the explanatory approach of computationalism, in which mutual consistency between ontological and epistemological components at all levels of explanation is indispensable. Too bad. David > > Bruce > > on pain of inconsistency. If these are unclear, then part of the > explanation is to make them explicit, on pain of obscurantism. And finally > of course to count as an explanation it must be susceptible of constraint > by evidence, on pain of pusillanimity. > > David > > > Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we > shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish > between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the > disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his > antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn > to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the > understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the > creation of effective AI. > > This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says, > this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than > the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the > scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more > successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of > the nature of reality. > > Bruce > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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