On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

    On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
    On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <agrayson2...@gmail.com
    <mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

        You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
        introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
        than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
        observers with the same memories and life histories for
        example. Give me a break. AG


    What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
    duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
    and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
    bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
    perhaps at the limit of what we can see?

    That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
    assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
    justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?

Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform for it to be extrapolated indefinitely.

Bruce

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