On 27/11/2017 5:17 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

    On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
    On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett
    <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

        On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
        On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <agrayson2...@gmail.com
        <mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

            You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
            room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
            complications than it purports to do away with;
            multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
            memories and life histories for example. Give me a
            break. AG


        What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
        duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
        Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
        the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world,
        ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?

        That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a
        particular assumption about the initial probability
        distribution. Can you justify that assumption?


    The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of
    the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the
    universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the
    strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?

    Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not
    imply that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological
    Principle is infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most
    probably false, since there is no reason for the initial
    conditions to be sufficiently uniform for it to be extrapolated
    indefinitely.


Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, since it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.

But the duplication you seemed to be referring to was that of the infinite Type I multiverse. It has been conjectured that this is the same as the Type III multiverse of MWI, but that can almost certainly be disproved. Strangeness may be one reason why people react against MWI and the multiverse, but that is not a relevant argument in serious discourse on foundations.

Bruce

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