On 27/11/2017 5:17 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett
<bhkell...@optusnet.com.au <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <agrayson2...@gmail.com
<mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:
You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
complications than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
memories and life histories for example. Give me a
break. AG
What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world,
ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a
particular assumption about the initial probability
distribution. Can you justify that assumption?
The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of
the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the
universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the
strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?
Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not
imply that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological
Principle is infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most
probably false, since there is no reason for the initial
conditions to be sufficiently uniform for it to be extrapolated
indefinitely.
Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite
structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it,
since it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.
But the duplication you seemed to be referring to was that of the
infinite Type I multiverse. It has been conjectured that this is the
same as the Type III multiverse of MWI, but that can almost certainly be
disproved. Strangeness may be one reason why people react against MWI
and the multiverse, but that is not a relevant argument in serious
discourse on foundations.
Bruce
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