On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
<mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, <agrayson2...@gmail.com
<mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:
You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG
What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
justify that assumption?
The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe
it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I
multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?
A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis. If the universe arose from
some physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process
could operate to produce multiple universes. This is true even for
supernatural creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they
might very well create many.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.