> On 23 Jul 2018, at 16:34, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jul 23, 2018 at 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > >> After duplication it would be misleading to call anything "THE Abby". > >> Abby-1 is just Abby plus something extra, lets call it M. And Abby-2 is > >> just Abby plus something extra that is different, lets call it W. Both > >> are Abby but Abby-1 is not Abby-2. > > > Yes, we agree on this since day one. > > At one time I thought so too but on day one for some strange reason you > started babbling about telepathy somehow being involved and you still talk > abut it, I had absolutely why you did that 5 years and I have no better idea > why you still do it now. You ofter say you agree on a certain point but very > soon it becomes clear you don't agree at all. > > > >But to answer to the step-3 question > > The only step-3 question John Clark wants answered is who the hell is Mr. > You? > >
In step-3, you can take any one. It is some person or robot, in Helsinki day one. And in W and M day two, as described in any third person diary. But of course, if I may say, the first person diaries *will* differ, as one will contain (M & ~W) and the other (W & ~M). > > > > > > > >we must keep in mind that it refers to the first person > > In a world that contains first person duplicating machines there is no such > thing as THE first person. That would contradict computationalism immediately, because it would mean that the first person in M has disappeared or is a zombie, and the same for the first person in W. You seem to remain unable to put yourself in any possible continuation. You seem to deny that in W, the guy feel to be only in W, and is aware he could not have predicted that outcome, given that would contradict its fellow in M, and he believes both are genuine survivors by computationalism. > > >>I define "Abby" as anyone who remembers being Abbey before the > duplication. Do you disagree? > > >>No, we can go with that. > > > >Indeed. > > This is a very good example of what I was talking about, you say you agree > with the above definition of "Abbey" but I would bet money you really don’t. Betting is not an argument. Show me any quote where I would not have agreed with your definition of Abbey. Oh, I might guess, but that is only because you forget to distinguish between the first person account (I am in Helsinki, I use the button, I find myself in one city (among W and M). > > > >> OK, and since 2 people meet the definition of "Abbey" then there is simply > >> no getting around the fact that "Abbey" will see 2 entirely different > >> things at exactly the same time. > > >That is the 3-1 description > > Wow, that didn't take long! Despite the "indeed" above you are NOT using my > definition of "Abbey”. I use it to describe the protocol, but the question is about the first person experience, that you seem to deny now, despite you did understood all this many times, but then you say that it is hardly original, instead of moving to step 4. > I can give a precise logically consistent definition of "Abbey", why can't > you? I can, but we have to distinguish the 1p and the 3p. Abbey is indeed surviving in both W and M, but only in one city, from both copies perspectives. > > > but that does not answer the question about the 1-description, > > The "question" was full of proper names with no definitions and personal > pronouns with no referent. In short there was no answer because there was no > question. Not at all. We have agreed on all name and pronoun this time. You make this up. > > > as lived by any copies, which obviously cannot have a first person > perception of the two cities at once FROM that first person perspective. > > That depends entirely on who the person in the first person perspective you > keep talking about is! All of them, of course, as we agree that in the 3-1p view, Abbey is in both city. So to get the statistic on the first person view accessible, we interview them both. > I can give a precise logically consistent definition of "Abbey" and I don't > have any need to change it on a daily bases, can you do the same thing? I use the same definition since the beginning, and I use the second recursion theorem o formalise this in arithmetic. All proposition I asset are theorem in first order or second order arithmetic. > If you can't then you quite literally don't know what you're talking about. > > >you dismiss the difference between the 1p self (both of which obviously > cannot feel to be in two places at once from their local current perspective > after the duplication) and the 3p perspective. > > I'll make you a deal, give me a precise unambiguous definition of the "p" > that you're using in the phrases "1p" and "3p" and I'll tell you if I really > dismiss the difference between the two or not. > > Informally, the 3p discourse is the content of some people describing the experience without entering in the ct-and-copuy box. The frist person discourses (note the s) is the content of the diaries which are taken by the guy entering the box. Bruno > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 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