> On 28 Sep 2018, at 22:04, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/28/2018 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> It's not something outside mathematics that is true
>> 
>> OK.
>> 
>> 
>>> in the sense that ice is cold.
>> 
>> 
>> That is also a belief by some machine, and it might be recovered in their 
>> phenomenology, in arithmetic.
>> 
>> We cannot discuss in the abstract. Doing metaphysics with the scientific 
>> method as for theory and means of verifying empirically the theory.
>> 
>> The mechanist theory predicts both matter and consciousness.
> 
> The question is whether it predicts that ice is cold. 

It should do it indirectly, yes. But it is the role of physics to explain, 
this, not metaphysics. Metaphysics must explain why there are things like ice 
and cold. 

Current physics explains this, but with many dubious assumptions, and fail to 
miss to predict what when we take ice in the hand, we feel it cold. 

Physics works only because it use an identity link, which unfortunately 
requires actual infinities to make sense.

My work expose a problem in metaphysics, and the beginning of a testable 
solution. 




> It not at all impressive to say it predicts that a some machine will believe 
> something like "ice is cold" when it also predicts some machine will also 
> believe "ice is hot" and another that "ice is friendly" and that "ice is 
> quadratic" and so on.

Exactly. But that is the problem with physics. Metaphysics seems to solve that 
problem by imposing a quantum measure, without introducing in an ad hoc manner 
just to fit the observation.

You are right, but your critics applies to physicalism, not Mechanism.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> 
>> Materialist theory assume matter, with some magical attribute, and miss 
>> consciousness. So …
>> 
> 
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