On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 1:25:27 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 3:58:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Mathematics is not philosophy. No need to assume a Platonic realm. You
>> assume only things like A->(B->A), or x + 0 = x, etc.
>>
>>
> In the order of things I assume:
>
> 1. I am conscious.
>
>
> You don’t need to assume it, nor can you, as it is not a formalisable
> notion. It is close to self-consistency, which, despite being true on PA
> makes PA inconsistent if assumed, or makes it into a new machine, where the
> same choice occur.
>
> Now, I know what you mean.
>
>
>
>
> 2. Matter is all there is.
>
>
> No problem with such axiom, but you will need a non mechanist theory of
> mind. And also some more explanation of what is matter, and how you derive
> 2+2=4 in the theory.
>
> And predict some old facts with less, or some new facts, etc.
>
>
>
>
> ...
> >=3. "x+0=x”
>
>
> The optimist believes that x+0 is slightly bigger than x, and the
> pessimist believes that x+0 is slightly smaller than x.
> But they are both deluded and confuse 0 with an infinitesimal.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
On matter and mechanism: So-called "mechanistic" materialism is considered
to be wrong by the new "experiential" (panpsychical) materialists. Their
new picture of matter has
*φ-states* (physical [including chemical and biological] states)
+ *ψ-states* (psychical [or experiential] states)
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
- pt
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