On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
<everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:



On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and arises 
thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot doubt (as 
Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. There is not 
scientific instrument that can detect consciousness.
That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious, 
unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day.  The myth that consciousness is 
a mystery is part hubris

Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time, 
where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have no 
souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and mechanism 
makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing universality, and 
self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity.




(we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for 
understanding.
With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the distinction 
between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware of.
That's where I disagree.  These two propositions cannot both be true:

1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating inference.

2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of computation (as defined by Bruno).

The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and 
sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be avoided 
if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the relevant 
computations).

What "person"?  Where did "person" come from?




There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an 
electron either.  But with the electron we're happy to have an effective theory 
that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering about 
consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement and 
prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory.
Assuming a physical reality,

It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically.  You have logicians attitude that everything must start from axioms...which are assumptions.

but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown.

No. You have argued it.  But your argument also implies that physics is necessary.   So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a contradiction.  So it's a reductio.  A reductio indicates something is wrong with the argument; but it doesn't tell you what.


Consciousness is simple, because computer science somehow predicts it, easily 
from incompleteness + Theaetetus.

You have /assumed/ that you can define it to be something simple and then you argue that because this simple thing has one or two similarities to the very complex thing we experience as consciousness it is therefore the same thing.  Even though in addition to similarities it also has some glaring differences, such as being timeless, such as knowing all logical inferences, such as existing independent of a matter.


It is matter the real hard problem in the mind-body problem, but we are not 
aware of this, a bit like fishes are not well placed to talk on water.

You have made it the hard problem of your theory by simplifying away all the observable complexities of consciousness and assuming it is mere Platonic arithmetic.

Brent


Bruno




Brent

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