> On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everything-list@googlegroups.com> >>> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>>> I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and arises >>>> thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot doubt (as >>>> Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. There is not >>>> scientific instrument that can detect consciousness. >>> That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious, >>> unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day. The myth that consciousness >>> is a mystery is part hubris >> >> Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time, >> where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have no >> souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and >> mechanism makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing >> universality, and self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity. >> >> >> >> >>> (we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for >>> understanding. >> With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the >> distinction between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware of. > That's where I disagree. These two propositions cannot both be true: > > 1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating inference. > > 2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of computation > (as defined by Bruno).
You must be careful as I did not say “1)” exactly, nor “2). 1) is that consciousness is immediately knowable, without the need of a reasoning to get the conclusion. It is typical of all experience. And 2) that immediate inference comes from the logic of [o]p = []p & <>t & p, and is proved to be immediate by using the fact that [o]p does not entail [o][o]p. > >> The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and >> sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be >> avoided if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the >> relevant computations). > > What "person"? Where did "person" come from? The person defined by all the modes of the self imposed by incompleteness. So the person can be 3p identified with []p, and its first person is determined by []p &p, and the other hypostases. The observable is given by []p & <>p with p sigma_1, etc. > >> >> >> >>> There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an >>> electron either. But with the electron we're happy to have an effective >>> theory that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering >>> about consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement >>> and prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory. >> Assuming a physical reality, > > It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically. Show me the paper. The only test that I know is the one I have given. I think I am the first to show that this is even testable. (Be careful Brent, I suspect you are taking the whole of physics as an empirical support of Primary Matter) but that is an assum^ption is metaphysics, not in physics. > You have logicians attitude that everything must start from axioms...which > are assumptions. In difficult metaphysical subject, that is wiser, to avoid confusion of level, etc. Yes. I studied logic for that very reason. > >> but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown. > > No. You have argued it. But your argument also implies that physics is > necessary. So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a contradiction. So > it's a reductio. A reductio indicates something is wrong with the argument; > but it doesn't tell you what. > Physics became necessary in the phenomenology, and necessarily Not in the ontology. So there is no contradiction. >> >> Consciousness is simple, because computer science somehow predicts it, >> easily from incompleteness + Theaetetus. > > You have assumed that you can define it to be something simple I assume YD + CT. > and then you argue that because this simple thing has one or two similarities > to the very complex thing we experience as consciousness it is therefore the > same thing. Absolutely not. I don’t do this even for the natural numbers, as we know that we cannot define them “univocally” at all. > Even though in addition to similarities it also has some glaring > differences, such as being timeless, such as knowing all logical inferences, > such as existing independent of a matter. To fuzzy. I can agree and disagree. I don’t see the relevance. > >> >> It is matter the real hard problem in the mind-body problem, but we are not >> aware of this, a bit like fishes are not well placed to talk on water. > > You have made it the hard problem of your theory by simplifying away all the > observable complexities of consciousness I work in a theory, but after Gödel and Traski understanding of the essential undecidability of any theory in which there are universal machine, you cannot say that it is a simplification a priori. > and assuming it is mere Platonic arithmetic. That is not assume. What is proved is that assuming more than arithmeti leads to inconsistency. Bruno > > Brent > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >>> <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ae59181-0197-8be6-a320-418771e9d823%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ae59181-0197-8be6-a320-418771e9d823%40verizon.net>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7e563a3c-4112-750b-f5a0-20e07b334cc0%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7e563a3c-4112-750b-f5a0-20e07b334cc0%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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