On 7/21/2019 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<everything-list@googlegroups.com
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List<everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and arises
thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot doubt (as
Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. There is not
scientific instrument that can detect consciousness.
That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious,
unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day. The myth that consciousness is
a mystery is part hubris
Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time,
where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have no
souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and mechanism
makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing universality, and
self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity.
(we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for
understanding.
With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the distinction
between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware of.
That's where I disagree. These two propositions cannot both be true:
1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating
inference.
2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of
computation (as defined by Bruno).
You must be careful as I did not say “1)” exactly, nor “2).
1) is that consciousness is immediately knowable, without the need of
a reasoning to get the conclusion. It is typical of all experience.
How is that different than what I wrote?
And 2) that immediate inference comes from the logic of [o]p = []p &
<>t & p, and is proved to be immediate by using the fact that [o]p
does not entail [o][o]p.
But that's not what you have said earlier. You said that 2) was an
axiom of consciousness. "Immediate inference" is a contradiction in
terms and I disagree that proofs define consciousness.
The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and
sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be avoided
if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the relevant
computations).
What "person"? Where did "person" come from?
The person defined by all the modes of the self imposed by
incompleteness.
But that's a Bruno-definition. It might have a grain of truth in
it...but there is a huge gap to be spanned between that definition and
the meaning of "person" in a simple sentence like "Bruno is a person".
Words have meanings and if you're going to introduce technical
definitions of common words then you are obliged to show that the
technical definition has the same extension.
So the person can be 3p identified with []p, and its first person is
determined by []p &p, and the other hypostases. The observable is
given by []p & <>p with p sigma_1, etc.
There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an
electron either. But with the electron we're happy to have an effective theory
that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering about
consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement and
prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory.
Assuming a physical reality,
It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically.
Show me the paper. The only test that I know is the one I have given.
I think I am the first to show that this is even testable.
(Be careful Brent, I suspect you are taking the whole of physics as an
empirical support of Primary Matter) but that is an assum^ption is
metaphysics, not in physics.
You are the only person I know who ever mentions "primary matter"...and
I know a lot of physicists.
You have logicians attitude that everything must start from
axioms...which are assumptions.
In difficult metaphysical subject, that is wiser, to avoid confusion
of level, etc. Yes. I studied logic for that very reason.
It is convenient, especially if you purport to give words special
technical meanings which then divorces then from the experience that
engendered them.
but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown.
No. You have argued it. But your argument also implies that physics
is necessary. So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a
contradiction. So it's a reductio. A reductio indicates something
is wrong with the argument; but it doesn't tell you what.
Physics became necessary in the phenomenology, and necessarily Not in
the ontology. So there is no contradiction.
You equivocate on "ontology". It means whatever exists. But you want
it to mean an axiomatic minimum. But you're whole construction of the
UD is phenomenology. Arithmetic is the phenomenology of PA by your meaning.
Consciousness is simple, because computer science somehow predicts it, easily
from incompleteness + Theaetetus.
You have /assumed/ that you can define it to be something simple
I assume YD + CT.
and then you argue that because this simple thing has one or two
similarities to the very complex thing we experience as consciousness
it is therefore the same thing.
Absolutely not. I don’t do this even for the natural numbers, as we
know that we cannot define them “univocally” at all.
I didn't ask for a definition. I asked for an argument that your
"discussion with a perfect machine" has some relevance to my consciousness.
Even though in addition to similarities it also has some glaring
differences, such as being timeless, such as knowing all logical
inferences, such as existing independent of a matter.
To fuzzy. I can agree and disagree. I don’t see the relevance.
What's fuzzy is the relevance of your theorizing to concrete experience.
It is matter the real hard problem in the mind-body problem, but we are not
aware of this, a bit like fishes are not well placed to talk on water.
You have made it the hard problem of your theory by simplifying away
all the observable complexities of consciousness
I work in a theory, but after Gödel and Traski understanding of the
essential undecidability of any theory in which there are universal
machine, you cannot say that it is a simplification a priori.
and assuming it is mere Platonic arithmetic.
That is not assume. What is proved is that assuming more than
arithmeti leads to inconsistency.
ZFC is more than arithmetic. Are you claiming it is inconsistent. Your
proof the UD instantiates consciousness, is the same as Borges library
instantiates your life story.
Brent
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
Brent
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