On Saturday, August 24, 2019 at 11:14:46 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via > Everything > > List wrote: > > > > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > > li...@hpcoders.com.au <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then > pigs > > and wings > > > > > can't > > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are > no > > minds that > > > > > might be > > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical > things, > > and > > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to > exist for > > minds > > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK > with the > > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then > the > > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of > physical > > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. > Do you > > mean > > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would > deny that > > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if > the > > brain > > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it > isn't > > > disembodied. > > > > > > Brent > > > > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment > could > > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, > etc to > > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > > > > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually > simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence > disembodied. > > Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my > book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience > of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for > the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and > the vat in this example). > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > >
"settle the matter" :) What is weird though is the number of people who think that there are "minds" that are some sort of non-material entities. To call them "patterns" is just the Platonism of reifying abstractions. It is no different from theology or supernaturalism. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/da066294-4e7d-487e-8842-abe3cc8ea312%40googlegroups.com.
