> On 15 Dec 2019, at 16:55, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Dec 15, 2019 at 6:55 AM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> >> every time I ask you for an example of a program in nothing but 
> >> "arithmetical reality" making a real calculation and producing a real 
> >> result you refer me to ASCII characters printed in the pages of a dusty 
> >> old book.
> 
> > Well, I am hoping to read, and understand them.
> I could do the same as you, and tell you that each time you answer a post, 
> you just add up a sequence of ASCII character.
> 
> But when my ASCII characters enter your physical computer in the form of 
> physical electrical impulses they cause the production of physical photons 
> radiating from your physical screen that enter your physical eye that then 
> sends a physical nerve impulse to your physical brain which process that 
> information in the way Turing described and then causes your physical fingers 
> to make certain physical movements over your physical keyboard.


That happens. No problem. But the whole thing happens in the arithmetical 
reality too, so your point here does not make matter primary.





> 
> > The notion of computation is absolute in the sense that all computations in 
> > derives models of arithmetic are the same.
> 
> I agree, all computations derived from nothing but pure arithmetic are 
> exactly the same because zero is equal to zero.

0 = 0 is not enough to axiomatise Arithmetic.





>  
> >> Turing already explained how matter can be intelligent,
> 
> > No. He just bet on computationalism. That does not make matter intelligent. 
> > That makes mater bale to emulate an intelligent person
> 
> I don't know what that means you need to give me an example.


There is no doubt (empirically) that matter is Turing-complete. So we can 
implement universal numbers with matter, and that happened with cells, brains 
and computers.

But the arithmetical reality, even a small part of it, do emulate *all* 
computations, thanks to the Church-turing thesis.

If mechanism is correct, you are Turing emulable at some level of description, 
and you are not able to distinguish between “you” (1p) when emulated by Fortran 
itself emulated by Algol  itself emulated in a physical universe itself emulate 
(at the right level) by arithmetic, from “you” emulated by Algol, emulated by 
Fortran, emulated by arithmetic, emulated by a physical universe. If you can 
distinguish those computations, you have something playing a role in your 
consciousness which would not be Turing emulable, and computationalism would be 
false.






> Was Einstein intelligent or did he just emulate an intelligent person and how 
> can you tell the difference? 


If it is an emulation done at the right substitution level, then it is Einstein 
(by definition). 

No machine can know-for-sure its own substitution level, but the machine might 
infer that level correctly, and some knowledge à-la Theaetetus is possible.



> 
> > If you believe that matter plays a role in the existence of a computation, 
> > you have to explain a bit more what you mean by matter
> 
> Rather than give a definition let me give an example. Matter is something 
> that can explain why the inverse of the Fine Structure Constant is the pure 
> dimensionless number 137.03602855338, physics can see that there is something 
> very very special about that pure number but to pure mathematics there is 
> absolutely nothing special about it even though it's a pure number, to 
> mathematics it's just another humdrum number. And that's why physics is more 
> fundamental than mathematics.


You beg the question by assuming that  137.03602855338 cannot be find by reason 
and mechanism, which it should if mechanism is correct.





> 
> > and explain how it can select a computation in arithmetic and make it “more 
> > real”,
> 
> I don't need to explain how matter makes computations more real,

Sorry, but you have to do that to refute my point, or refute it in another way.




> I just need to demonstrate that it does, and to do that all I have to do is 
> point to one of INTEL's multi-billion dollar chip fabrication foundries.


I might be dreaming when you do that. Ostensive definition are helpful in 
practice, but cannot be used to prove the primary character of something. 
Whatever experience you propose to me is dream-able (assuming mechanism), and 
so does not prove any sort of primitive existence.

Bruno 





> 
> John K Clark
> 
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