On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou
<stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou
<stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou
<stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
_> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark
will see a prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime
number. A gambler who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the
probability that one particular gambler will buy the winning ticket,
not the probability that some gambler will buy the winning ticket_
BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John
Clark" are exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is
the person Bruno makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the
identity of Mr.You becomes completely ambiguous, there is now no way
to tell who he made the bet with, or how to determine the outcome
and figure out who won and who lost. And that's why Bruno loves
personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using them, they can
be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under the
rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of
your theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can
stop using personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee
terminology and start talking about THE First Person Perspective,
when of course after the duplication there is no such thing as THE
First Person Perspective, there is only A First Person Perspective.
___Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the
100,_
But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict
BEFORE the duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out
because there is only one John Clark. And this thought experiment is
about what "you" can expect to see, so the gambler must be Mr.You,
so the gambler is also duplicated 100 times.
_> and the question is asked, what is the probability that this
particular one will see a prime number? _
I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the
duplication when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around
and looks at the number on his door he will see a prime number, but
that is a very VERY long way from the original ambiguous question
that was asked BEFORE the duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication
what is the probability "you" will see a prime number?". And that
has no answer because it is not a question, it's gibberish.
I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the
dualist idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question
of probability with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the
duplicates this soul will fly into. We know that souls are delusional,
and this applies to a single world situation also. If you survive the
night, it means that an entity identifying as John Clark wakes up in
your bed tomorrow morning, not that your soul has persisted in the one
body. If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has
survived, because all it takes is one, and there is a 25/100
probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number.
This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you”
cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in
the first place.
I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your
response to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the
probability that you will see a prime number on your door when you
wake tomorrow?". As JC points out, by tomorrow there will be 100
individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" to whom you posed the
question yesterday? If the question in that form has an answer, then
you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next morning has
inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you originally
referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only to
asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you
avoid this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial
"You" referred to, is the random individual you selected in the
morning. If the two questions are to be related at all, then you must
make the dualist assumption.
I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what
is the probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what
is the probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime
number". Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will fly into
one, and only one, of the John Clarks, but they are wrong, just as
they are wrong about a magical soul persisting in a single John Clark
waking up in his bed normally, ensuring that it is him and not someone
who merely believes he is him.
I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
persons."
Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
dualism that hangs over your theory.
Bruce
