On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote: >>>>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit >>>>>> dualist >>>>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the >>>>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow >>>>>> morning, >>>>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist >>>>>> and >>>>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is >>>>>> because >>>>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In >>>>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are >>>>>> separate >>>>>> >> persons." >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent >>>>>> and >>>>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of >>>>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory. >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Bruce >>>>>> >> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical >>>>>> > states of the copies. >>>>>> >>>>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your >>>>>> soul and is "you". I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce >>>>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100. They all remember the >>>>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get >>>>>> $100 or lose $25. The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet >>>>>> certainly >>>>>> creates problems in law and language. But law and language are >>>>>> invented >>>>>> to deal with reality, not define it. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question >>>>> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you >>>>> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and >>>>> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of >>>>> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication >>>>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that >>>>> theory for some undefined reason. >>>>> >>>> >>>> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a >>>> continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any >>>> time, implies dualism. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no >>> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily >>> the closest. Dualism is not required. >>> >> >> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person >> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference >> for it? >> > > Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a > convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of > personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not > as satisfactory. > I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWWG1%2BTwaBqC5GfBp1xXmaHFXj54rG_0yeRjth2gTUmuw%40mail.gmail.com.
