On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 12:45 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 10:58, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none >>>>>>>>> are privileged. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some >>>>>>>> way if there is to be a probability different from zero. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that >>>>>>> it isn't dualist? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are >>>>>> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption. >>>>>> >>>>>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the >>>>>>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular >>>>>>> outcome. I >>>>>>> am one randomly sampled copy. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that is intrinsic in >>>>>> all self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood >>>>>> this >>>>>> when he says "That seems to imply dualism. All the bodies exist, but >>>>>> your >>>>>> soul only goes with one." >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the >>>>> probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the >>>>> carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a >>>>> particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you >>>>> do, >>>>> and there seems to be no way around it. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand >>>> one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of >>>> the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will >>>> get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you >>>> have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent. >>>> >>> >>> Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place >>> where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use >>> dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication? >>> >> >> >> Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary. You >> are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies on a >> particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and Everett >> with non-degenerate eigenvalues. >> >> You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by increasing >> the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says everything that is >> necessary. >> > > From what I understand of your position, you would claim that the 1 in > 10^100 copy will screw up the very concept of probability. If that extra > copy did not exist, you would take dollars, because you will certainly need > dollars; but with the extra copy you would just throw up your hands and say > you don't know what to do, because it is certain you will need dollars and > euros. > My complaint about your example is that you are changing the problem -- you are changing the probabilities in a way that is incompatible with both the Schrodinger equation and the Born rule. But there could be more moderate examples of branch duplication that would be more in line with what is proposed by some people. For example, both Sean Carroll and Zurek propose a procedure whereby they expand the number of branches so that all branches have equal amplitudes (weights, or Born probabilities). This is incompatible with the Schrodinger equation, but if we leave that aside for the moment, it gives a branch-counting solution to the probability question. The idea then is that you self-select from a uniform random distribution over this expanded set of branches. However, the expansion of the number of branches in this approach is, in fact, unnecessary, since random self-selection from a distribution would give the same result if the distribution were determined directly by the Born rule. But this is still inconsistent with the Schrodinger equation because there is nothing in the SE that tells you that you have a probability distribution given by the Born weights. You can impose the Born rule by fiat, but that is then incompatible with the fact that every outcome in the Schrodinger equation occurs with probability equal to one. (Which is where we started). The self-selection idea, whether from an expanded set of branches with equal weights, or from the original number of branches weighted by the Born rule, still involves the idea of a random selection from a distribution. This is not part of the Schrodinger equation, and it is still essentially dualist since it requires the selection of one unique individual who is not specified by the equations -- it assumes that just one of the individuals involved is uniquely specified to be YOU -- by virtue of an immortal soul or some such. None of this is in the physics. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLSJe6USNedghCykzwrkeU2A-QqOoFtJemJmv%2BPLXEx%2BUw%40mail.gmail.com.
