On Wednesday, January 13, 2021 at 5:50:29 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
> On Tuesday, January 12, 2021 at 10:19:59 PM UTC-7 Pierz wrote: > >> >> >> On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:09:06 PM UTC+11 agrays...@gmail.com >> wrote: >> >>> On Sunday, January 3, 2021 at 3:56:51 PM UTC-7 johnk...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, Jan 3, 2021 at 5:21 PM Alan Grayson <agrays...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> *> The MWI doesn't guarantee that these subsequent measurements, for >>>>> subsequent horse races say, are occurring in the SAME OTHER worlds as >>>>> trials progress, to get ensembles in those OTHER worlds. * >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't know what you mean by "SAME OTHER worlds", the same as what? In >>>> one world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go left, in >>>> another world Alan Grayson remembers having seen the electron go right, >>>> other than that the two worlds are absolutely identical, so which one was >>>> the "SAME OTHER world"? >>>> >>>> > You seem to avoid the fact that no where does the MWI guarantee [...] >>>> >>>> >>>> Quantum mechanics is not in the guarantee business, it deals with >>>> probability. >>>> >>>> *> I don't think you understand my point, which isn't complicated. * >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, your point is very simple indeed, but the word simple can have 2 >>>> meanings, one of them is complementary and the other not so much. >>>> >>> >>> In first trial, the MWI postulates other worlds comes into existence. >>> Same other worlds in second trial? Same other worlds in third trial, etc? >>> Where does the MWI assert these other worlds are the SAME other worlds? >>> Unless it does, you only have ONE measurement in each of these worlds. No >>> probability exists in these other worlds since no ensemble of measurements >>> exist in these other world. AG >>> >> >> You grossly misunderstand MWI. There are no "same other" worlds. The >> worlds that arise at each trial are different in precisely one way and one >> way only: the eigenvalue recorded for the experiment. The different >> eigenvalues will then give rise to a "wave of differentiations" as the >> consequences of that singular difference ramifies, causing the different >> worlds generated by the original experimental difference to multiply. >> "World" really means a unique configuration of the universal wave function, >> so two worlds at different trials can't possibly be the "same world", and >> yes, there is only one measurement in each. >> > > This is what I have been saying all along! AG > No it isn't. I agree you have been saying there is only one measurement outcome in each world. However this business about "same other worlds" betrays your lack of comprehension. It's not that MWI "doesn't guarantee" that the the worlds at each trial are the same world. It's that the whole notion of "same other worlds" means nothing in this context and has no bearing on anything. A bit like arguing when we add 1 and 1 twice whether we are guaranteed that the ones we add each time are the "SAME ones" at each addition. If mathematics can't guarantee that then how can we be sure the answer is the same? Basically the only answer to that is "WTF?" > > >> That is precisely the stipulation of MWI. If we have a quantum experiment >> with two eigenvalues 1 and 0, and each is equally likely per the Born rule, >> then the MWI interpretation is that - effectively - two worlds are created. >> You, the experimenter, end up in both, each version knowing nothing about >> the other. >> > > Again, what I have been saying all along! AG > If you get that, then the next bit follows. > > >> So, in the "objective world" (the view from outside the whole wave >> function as it were), no probability is involved. But if you repeat this >> experiment many times, each version of you will record an apparently random >> sequence of 1s and 0s. Your best prediction of what happens in the next >> experiment is that it's a 50/50 toss up between 1 and 0. Objectively >> there's no randomness, subjectively it appears that way. >> > > Here's where you go astray. AG > So you say! Without justifying yourself in any way. You *seem* to be saying that probability can't describe QM experiments because in each world there is only one outcome and therefore no "ensemble" of outcomes from which a probability can be derived. That is totally wrong-headed. There are two "ensembles": the ensemble of different multiverse branches at each experiment, and the ensemble of each experimenter's prior measurements, and those are enough to derive the appearance of randomness and to justify a probabilistic description despite the objective lack of randomness. If you agree with "what you have been saying all along", then you must agree that every experimenter in every world in an MWI multiverse will see a record of an apparently random sequence of 1s and 0s in the described experiment. Right? And if not why not? > >> >>> >>> >>>> John K Clark See my new list at Extropolis >>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >>>> >>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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