Le dim. 25 juil. 2021 à 23:38, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> On Sun, Jul 25, 2021 at 4:44 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> *> And you have no way of knowing what it will feel like to be John K
>> Clark tomorrow, but you have a pretty good theory about it. *
>>
>
> Yes, and tomorrow I will be able to definitively know if yesterday's
> theory about what it will be like to be John K Clark today turned out to be
> correct or not.
>
> * > Similarly, you probably have a better theory about what it would feel
>> like to be Brent Meeker than to be DeepMind. *
>>
>
> No, there's nothing similar at all about it because tomorrow I will STILL have
> absolutely positively no way of knowing if yesterday's theory about what it
> will be like to be Brent Meeker or DeepMind today turned out to be
> correct or not, in fact I will NEVER know if it's correct
>
> > *Consciousness is imagined be an impossibly hard problem because it's
>> posed as being able to predict conscious thoughts from monitoring a brain. *
>>
>
> The hardest part of the "hard problem of consciousness" is clearly
> explaining exactly what "the hard problem of consciousness" is, it's not at
> all clear to me exactly what sort of explanation would satisfy the
> consciousness gurus.
>

You explained it yourself in the preceeding paragraph, let me quote it for
you:
"in fact I will NEVER know if it's correct"

That's the *hard* problem of consciousness, others qualia.

Quentin


>
> *> But that's like saying gravity is a hard problem because we can't
>> predict the motion of all the stars in a galaxy (or even three bodies).*
>>
>
> I can make exact Newtonian predictions in a few very special situations
> but in general you're right, I can't make an exact prediction of the
> motion of 3 particles, but I can make some very good approximations, and by
> using The Virial Theorem I can even make a good approximation for the
> motions of millions of bodies. However I don't know, and will never know,
> if my predictions about a consciousness other than my own is even
> approximately correct. And that's why consciousness theories are so easy
> to dream up, and that's also why they're such a colossal bore.
>
> *> the fact that you can say the consciousness of DeepMind might be so
>> different you have no way of knowing what it would be like implies that
>> there can be qualitatively different kinds of consciousness. *
>>
>
> Yes. I only have experience with my own consciousness but I know for a
> fact that depending on the time of day my consciousness can be
> qualitatively different, and I've known that for a long time. Back when I
> was a student taking a calculus exam my consciousness had reached a
> high-level but later that same night when I was falling asleep it was at a
> much lower level and just a little later it fell all the way to zero, and
> then what seemed instantaneous but actually took 8 hours it started up
> again.
>
>  John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis
> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>
> 0o0o
>
>
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