On Tue, Jul 9, 2024, 7:22 PM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On 7/8/2024 1:20 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024, 4:01 PM John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 2:23 PM Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> *> If you believe mental states do not cause anything, then you believe >>> philosophical zombies are logically possible (since we could remove >>> consciousness without altering behavior).* >>> >> >> Not if consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of intelligece, and I'm >> almost certain that it is. >> > > If consciousness is necessary for intelligence, then it's not a byproduct. > If on the other hand, consciousness is just a useless byproduct, then it > could (logically if not nomologically) be eliminated without affecting > intelligent. > > You seem to want it to be both necessary but also be something that makes > no difference to anything (which makes it unnecessary). > > I would be most curious to hear your thoughts regarding the section of my > article on "Conscious behaviors" -- that is, behaviors which (seem to) > require consciousness in order to do them. > > >> *> I view mental states as high-level states operating in their own >>> regime of causality (much like a Java computer program).* >>> >> >> I have no problem with that, actually it's very similar to my view. >> > > That's good to hear. > > >> >>> *> The java computer program can run on any platform, regardless of the >>> particular physical nature of it.* >>> >> >> Right. You could even say that "computer program" is not a noun, it is an >> adjective, it is the way a computer will behave when the machine's logical >> states are organized in a certain way. And "I" is the way atoms behave >> when they are organized in a Johnkclarkian way, and "you" is the way atoms >> behave when they are organized in a Jasonreschian way. >> > > I'm not opposed to that framing. > >> >> *> I view consciousness as like that high-level control structure. It >>> operates within a causal realm where ideas and thoughts have causal >>> influence and power, and can reach down to the lower level to do things >>> like trigger nerve impulses.* >>> >> >> Consciousness is a high-level description of brain states that can be >> extremely useful, but that doesn't mean that lower level and much more >> finely grained description of brain states involving nerve impulses, or >> even more finely grained descriptions involving electrons and quarks are >> wrong, it's just that such level of detail is unnecessary and impractical >> for some purposes. >> > > I would even say, that at a certain level of abstraction, they become > irrelevant. It is the result of what I call "a Turing firewall", software > has no ability to know its underlying hardware implementation, it is an > inviolable separation of layers of abstraction, which makes the lower > levels invisible to the layers above. > > That's roughly true, but not exactly. If you think of intelligence > implemented on a computer it would make a difference if it had a true > random number generator (hardware) or not. > There was a study done in the 1950s on probabilistic Turing machines ( https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781400882618-010/html?lang=en ) that found what they could compute is no different than what a deterministic Turing machine can compute. "The computing power of Turing machines provided with a random number generator was studied in the classic paper [Computability by Probabilistic Machines]. It turned out that such machines could compute only functions that are already computable by ordinary Turing machines." — Martin Davis in “The Myth of Hypercomputation” (2004) To see why consider that programs can similarly split themselves and run in parallel with each of the possible values. To each instance of the split program, the value it is provided will seem random. But importantly: what the program can computes with this value is the same as what it would compute had the value come from a "truly random" quantum measurement. It would make a difference if it were a quantum computer or not. > For us observing the program run from the outside, it would make a difference. But the program itself has way of distinguishing if it is receiving a value that came from a real measurement of a quantum system, or if it was provided the result of a simulated quantum system. And going the other way, what if it didn't have a multiply operation. > We're so accustomed the standard Turing-complete von Neumann computer we > take it for granted. > A program will crash if it's run on a hardware that it's not compatible with. This is why you can't take a .exe from windows and run it on a Mac. But if you run a windows emulator on the Mac you can then run the .exe within it. The program the has no idea it is running on a Mac, it has every reason to believe it is running on a real windows computer, but it is fooled by the emulation layer (this emulation layer is what I speak of when to refer to the "Turing firewall"). That such layers can be created is a direct consequence of the fact that all Turing machines are capable of emulating each other. Jason > So the neurons and molecular forces aren't in the drivers seat for what > goes on in the brain. That is the domain of higher level structures and > forces. We cannot ignore completely the lower levels, they provide the > substrate upon which the higher levels are built, but I think it is an > abuse of reductionism that leads people to saying consciousness is an > epiphenomenon and doesn't do anything. When no one would try to apply > reductionism to explain why, when a glider in the game of life hits a block > and causes it to self destruct, that it is due to quantum mechanics in our > universe, rather than a consequence of the very different rules of the game > of life as they operate in the game of life universe. > > Jason > > > >> John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis >> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis> >> qb2 >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv28Yh4o5TGpuZ2nfh7NFxYWbi4yVW%2B5v%3DbeXULDqdbPsg%40mail.gmail.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv28Yh4o5TGpuZ2nfh7NFxYWbi4yVW%2B5v%3DbeXULDqdbPsg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjBw4RA-YBpKERYR5swmxieSUkv_%3DXyttLmszc8XOtd8g%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjBw4RA-YBpKERYR5swmxieSUkv_%3DXyttLmszc8XOtd8g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3724cae4-dcf3-4987-a190-108891f1f9ef%40gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3724cae4-dcf3-4987-a190-108891f1f9ef%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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