On Friday 13 September 2024 at 12:20:01 UTC+12 Russell Standish wrote: One of the consequences of the universal dovetailer argument is that if conciousness is computational, then physics is not.
That's interesting. I don't see how that could happen, would you mind elaborating? (I've read "The Amoeba's Secret" thanks to you but I can't remember this part). Intrinsic randomness arises from the first person view of the operation of the dovetailer. I can see that, at least, I think it's similar to the idea of apparent randomness in many-worlds? Perhaps what you're thinking of is oracles solving computationally impossible problems, such as delivering the successive digits of the Chaitin probablility Ω. A corrolary of this is that a computational physics à la Konrad Zuse's Rechnender Raum would rule out computationalism, and consequently physical supervenience. I can see how that follows from the first paragraph, but as mentioned I can't think how computational consciousness leads to non-computational physics (or exactly what that means). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bb7aa002-e50c-4239-8cef-77f0e3feab8cn%40googlegroups.com.
