Thanks for keeping this ball in play. <snip> > > > > > > I think you really have to make a distinction > > > between a belief adopted from external sources > > > and one generated by powerful subjective > > > experience. Not that the latter is necessarily > > > any more valid than the former, but you can't > > > use the same kind of epistemological analysis > > > that you do for externally acquired beliefs to > > > evaluate them. > > > > I'm not sure that the source matters for proving > > something. > > Well, in the first place, the demand for > proof of such beliefs as reincarnation or > the existence of God is a category error. > I'm talking about epistemological analysis, > not "proof" per se.
I'm not sure about that. For Reincarnation they are making specific claims about having memories of what actually existed in the world when they were alive before. So in principle they can be tested. We may not know what happens after death, but if someone claims that they DO know because they can remember specifics of having lived before it can be tested. Sam Harris makes the point about the God belief that religious people are actually making claims about how the world actually is. They are going beyond describing a place after death. So challenging their assertions with a request for proof seems reasonable to me. If you look at Christian beliefs based on the New Testament's claims, we do see an attempt for an evidence system based on the Jesus miracles. They may default to faith on a challenge to their bad evidence, but they do try to make a proof. When you throw in the prophesy of the Old Testament we have another attempt at a proof system that we may not regard as reasonable today. (at least I don't) > > In terms of externally acquired beliefs, > they're pretty well defined as to their > specifics and provenance. Any externally > acquired belief is by definition one that is > shared by multiple individuals, and we can > gather empirical data about the circumstances > of its acceptance by any given individual. We > can know much more about its nature and > grounds than we can with beliefs arising from > subjective experience. > > As an example, take the kid who grows up in a > fundamentalist household. We know where the kid > acquired his/her beliefs and what they are; we > know the social imperatives influencing the kid > to accept the beliefs. > Now take a kid who grows up in an atheist, > materialist household who has a profound mystical > experience at a very young age. Nobody around him > is going to validate the experience or validate > any beliefs the kid may develop as a result. I think he would pretty much have to be raised by wolves for this to be true. Kids are such sponges. I hear from my Atheist mom friends that their kids discuss all sorts of religious things they never taught them. But I guess Mao's China or Russia might have met the necessary conditions. > > There's no way to trace the origins of those > beliefs because what generated them was a > purely internal, private occurrence. If the > kid holds on to the beliefs, it isn't because > of parental pressure; if there's any pressure, > it's to drop the beliefs. > > So it seems to me there's an element operating > in this situation that doesn't exist with > externally acquired beliefs, one that isn't > subject to examination or analysis, at least in > anything like the same way as with externally > acquired beliefs. It seems the same to me. Lets take the beliefs of an OCD person who KNOWS that if they don't turn the light off and on 3 times something bad will happen. Once he articulates this belief it is subject to someone saying, "this is not true" and I think it can be proven. > > It's pretty well established that there's a > psychological component to accepting external > beliefs, but that isn't necessarily the case > with beliefs arising from profound mystical > experience. Psychology may influence how the > experience is interpreted, but we don't know > what the role of psychology is in the > experience itself. I agree that we don't know how beliefs shape ineffable experiences. It is in the world of interpretation when these become important. Take my recent experiment with meditating again. I had similar experiences to when I also had the belief system in place. (Although I will never know its unconscious influence.) > > Subjective experience of this sort is really > an epistemological black box. That's why I > think making a distinction is important. I think you have a knack for isolating a pretty clean version of experience sans belief. It took me quite a few years to understand it. (assuming that I actually do!) But for most people who have these experiences, they quickly do make statements about what it means and then they are subject to the "WTF" line of epistemological questioning just like everybody else. I think this is Sam Harris's main point. That we don't have to give a person a pass on claims just because they came from an inner source once they cross the threshold of talking about their meaning. And without discussion we just have a bunch of people sitting around like Maharishi claims he did with the yogis in Uttar Kashi. >
