--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, zarzari_786 <no_reply@...> wrote: > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, Emily Reyn <emilymae.reyn@> wrote: > > <snip> > > But the nature of being a human being means for me having > > the experience of being radically isolated and detached > > from the external world. I do not have anything in common > > with the stars, the moon, the flowers, the sky, the animals. > > What I have is my first person ontology, and that ontology > > cannot be mixed with anything that is not that ontology. > > > > Dear Robin, I am trying to understand this statement. Â Is > > your experience of yourself now in alignment with John > > Searle's philosophy on "first person ontology"? > > Interesting find Emily, this is what the wiki says: > > "It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property > dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties > are categorically different from his or her micro-physical > properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas > the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is > accessible objectively by any number of people, as when > several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. > But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the > person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has > that mode of access." > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism > > If I understand this correctly, "first-person ontology" can > only be subjectivly observed, and therefore refer to a > consciousness process that is not observable by objective > science. In a way it seems to be synonymous with the > consciousness of a subject himself, but NOT, as Robin alludes > to, with his sense of a separate I (I think thats what he is > refering to). From what I read in this article, it is only > about consciousness, being a property of brain processes, but > 'as subjectivly experienced'. If I am not mistaken, this has > nothing to do with free will, or it being the consciousness > of a human being vs an animal. Whereas Robin seems to take it > synonymous for the awareness of an 'I', that feels and is > responsible for all his actions. To use such a relatively > rare term like 'first-person ontology', for basically the > sense of an 'I' and Doership, seems to me somewhat concealing > rather than explaining. It certainly sound impressive.
The term isn't that rare in discussions of philosophy and consciousness, actually. Searle didn't invent it, nor does he "own" it. The term itself really doesn't need much explanation. It may sound impressive to those who aren't familiar with it, but it's a simple concept. It can be used in many different contexts and for many different purposes. Searle makes use of it for his purposes; Robin makes use of it for his purposes. What requires explanation is the purposes, and Robin has explained his pretty thoroughly: he's arguing against the reality of Unity Consciousness, in which first-person ontology is experienced to be illusionary and universal consciousness the reality. As I understand him, he's saying first-person ontology is the reality and universal consciousness the illusion. Nothing like Unity Consciousness figures in Searle's use of the term; it isn't on his radar screen at all. Far as I can tell, the closest he comes is to deny panpsychism. He's using the term "first-person ontology" in the same sense Robin is, but in an entirely different context to make an entirely different type of argument: to demolish functional materialism (although he also denies dualism, which some see as contradictory). Searle does argue for a form of free will, but it's based in quantum indeterminism, not the classical form asserted by Robin. Searle's arguments are considerably more sophisticated philosophically and scientifically than Robin's, as it happens; Robin's are experientially and theologically based and are deeply personal. In any case, it's pretty much coincidental that Searle and Robin use the same term. Their respective arguments are really unrelated.
