Oh my fucking (in the most respectful of ways) god. This is the answer I've been waiting for - finally, some real clarity. Jesus (in honor of Christmas) Judy, you are the bomb. The kids are gone, bless their hearts, and it is still Christmas. Now I think I'm ready for the re-read of the five part post. I have it all in a draft email to myself, except for number 5. I think that one was deleted. So, Curtis, if you want me to send you the links to the 5 parts, you let me know :)
>________________________________ > From: authfriend <jst...@panix.com> >To: FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com >Sent: Sunday, December 25, 2011 3:02 PM >Subject: [FairfieldLife] Re: A Third Open Letter to Ravi Chivukula > > > >--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, zarzari_786 <no_reply@...> wrote: >> >> --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@> wrote: >> > >> > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, zarzari_786 <no_reply@> >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, Emily Reyn <emilymae.reyn@> >> > wrote: >> > > > <snip> >> > > > But the nature of being a human being means for me having >> > > > the experience of being radically isolated and detached >> > > > from the external world. I do not have anything in common >> > > > with the stars, the moon, the flowers, the sky, the animals. >> > > > What I have is my first person ontology, and that ontology >> > > > cannot be mixed with anything that is not that ontology. >> > > > >> > > > Dear Robin, I am trying to understand this statement. Â Is >> > > > your experience of yourself now in alignment with John >> > > > Searle's philosophy on "first person ontology"? >> > > >> > > Interesting find Emily, this is what the wiki says: >> > > >> > > "It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property >> > > dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties >> > > are categorically different from his or her micro-physical >> > > properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas >> > > the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is >> > > accessible objectively by any number of people, as when >> > > several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. >> > > But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the >> > > person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has >> > > that mode of access." >> > > >> > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism >> > > >> > > If I understand this correctly, "first-person ontology" can >> > > only be subjectivly observed, and therefore refer to a >> > > consciousness process that is not observable by objective >> > > science. In a way it seems to be synonymous with the >> > > consciousness of a subject himself, but NOT, as Robin alludes >> > > to, with his sense of a separate I (I think thats what he is >> > > refering to). From what I read in this article, it is only >> > > about consciousness, being a property of brain processes, but >> > > 'as subjectivly experienced'. If I am not mistaken, this has >> > > nothing to do with free will, or it being the consciousness >> > > of a human being vs an animal. Whereas Robin seems to take it >> > > synonymous for the awareness of an 'I', that feels and is >> > > responsible for all his actions. To use such a relatively >> > > rare term like 'first-person ontology', for basically the >> > > sense of an 'I' and Doership, seems to me somewhat concealing >> > > rather than explaining. It certainly sound impressive. >> > >> > The term isn't that rare in discussions of philosophy >> > and consciousness, actually. Searle didn't invent it, >> > nor does he "own" it. >> >> Okay, I didn't know this. Probably like Emily, I just googled >> the term and the above wiki came up first. From the way it was >> expressed I had the (wrong) impression it was his term. >> >> > The term itself really doesn't >> > need much explanation. It may sound impressive to those >> > who aren't familiar with it, but it's a simple concept. >> >> And that is? Or what is the concept behind third-person ontology? > >First-person ontology: only I can know what it's >like to be me. Third-person ontology: you can >understand what it's like to be me via what I tell >you or what you observe of me, but it'll be quite >limited and may be false (because I'm lying or >otherwise behaving deceptively, or because I'm >communicating poorly or you're understanding >poorly). > >Your understanding of what it's like to be me is >a function of *your* first-person ontology: only >you can know what it's like to be you trying to >grasp what it's like to be me. Only I can know what >it's like to be me trying to grasp what it's like >to be you trying to grasp what it's like to be me. > >;-) > >or ;-(, depending... > >This isn't the *grammatical* third person, BTW. It >just means anybody other than me. (I just did a >search for "second person ontology" to make sure and >came up with only one hit, on an analysis of a poem >by e.e. cummings, where it refers to a literary >device.) > >> > It can be used in many different contexts and for many >> > different purposes. Searle makes use of it for his >> > purposes; Robin makes use of it for his purposes. What >> > requires explanation is the purposes, and Robin has >> > explained his pretty thoroughly: he's arguing against the >> > reality of Unity Consciousness, in which first-person >> > ontology is experienced to be illusionary and universal >> > consciousness the reality. As I understand him, he's >> > saying first-person ontology is the reality and universal >> > consciousness the illusion. >> >> I understand this so far. For example, does it simply mean >> that the consciousness of man is simply isolated, for example >> mind reading is not a reality. You cannot participate in the >> consciousness of somebody else, and therefore there is also >> no unity consciousness, is it that what you mean he is saying >> with it? > >Well, he says Unity Consciousness is a real state of >consciousness, but it isn't congruent with reality--or >Reality--as I understand him. I'm not sure mind reading >would be ruled out, depending on how you're defining it. >You might know some things that were in my mind via some >kind of telepathy--say at a distance--for instance, but >that wouldn't tell you what it's like to be me; it >wouldn't be participating in my consciousness. It would >still be third-person ontology, just using a different >means of communication. > >I'm flying blind here; Robin's going to have to bail us >out. > >It may be that Reality (cap R) above is equivalent to >God's will in Robin's thinking. > >ROBIN, HELP!! > >> > Nothing like Unity Consciousness figures in Searle's use >> > of the term; it isn't on his radar screen at all. Far as >> > I can tell, the closest he comes is to deny panpsychism. >> > He's using the term "first-person ontology" in the same >> > sense Robin is, but in an entirely different context to >> > make an entirely different type of argument: to demolish >> > functional materialism (although he also denies dualism, >> > which some see as contradictory). Searle does argue for >> > a form of free will, but it's based in quantum >> > indeterminism, not the classical form asserted by Robin. >> >> Yes, it wouldn't really have anything top do with it, >> which was basically my point. > >Don't know how, or if, Robin's assertion of classical free >will is directly related to first-person ontology in his >argument either. He says his experience of Unity >Consciousness was that he had no free will at all. But >there are some good scientific arguments that the >experience of having free will may be just that, an >experience, not the neurological reality. That doesn't >mean, however, that the universe is making all our >decisions for us. Rather, they're contingent on our wiring, >our genes, our background, the sum of our life experience >being-in-the-world. > >That would still be first-person ontology, what it's like >to be me--including my sense that I have free will. No >third person involved. > >> > Searle's arguments are considerably more sophisticated >> > philosophically and scientifically than Robin's, as it >> > happens; Robin's are experientially and theologically >> > based and are deeply personal. >> >> Sure. >> >> > In any case, it's pretty much coincidental that Searle >> > and Robin use the same term. Their respective arguments >> > are really unrelated. >> >> Anyway, thank you for taking the trouble and trying to >> explain, both you and Emily! > >My pleasure (literally; I enjoyed it, and I learned some >things as well). Thanks to Emily for coming up with the >question in the first place. > >Robin's going to have quite a mess to clean up... > > > > >
