Judy, you are wisdom incarnate. I agree with Denise. Merry Hanakristmasah! My hands are still tied to my kitchen and I love reading what you both write. : )
--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@...> wrote: > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, Emily Reyn <emilymae.reyn@> wrote: > > > > Oh my fucking (in the most respectful of ways) god. Â This > > is the answer I've been waiting for - finally, some real > > clarity. Â Jesus (in honor of Christmas) Judy, you are the > > bomb. > > Yikes. Please, Emily, note my caveat below: "I'm flying > blind here." It's too big of a hassle to stick in "at > least, as I understand it" after every statement, but > please insert it mentally before you decide I'm Wisdom > Incarnate!! > > > The kids are gone, bless their hearts, and it is still > > Christmas. Â Now I think I'm ready for the re-read of the > > five part post. Â I have it all in a draft email to myself, > > except for number 5. Â I think that one was deleted. Â So, > > Curtis, if you want me to send you the links to the 5 parts, > > you let me know :) Â > > > > > > >________________________________ > > > From: authfriend <jstein@> > > >To: FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com > > >Sent: Sunday, December 25, 2011 3:02 PM > > >Subject: [FairfieldLife] Re: A Third Open Letter to Ravi Chivukula > > > > > > > > >Â > > >--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, zarzari_786 <no_reply@> wrote: > > >> > > >> --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@> wrote: > > >> > > > >> > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, zarzari_786 <no_reply@> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > > >> > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, Emily Reyn <emilymae.reyn@> > > >> > wrote: > > >> > > > <snip> > > >> > > > But the nature of being a human being means for me having > > >> > > > the experience of being radically isolated and detached > > >> > > > from the external world. I do not have anything in common > > >> > > > with the stars, the moon, the flowers, the sky, the animals. > > >> > > > What I have is my first person ontology, and that ontology > > >> > > > cannot be mixed with anything that is not that ontology. > > >> > > > > > >> > > > Dear Robin, I am trying to understand this statement. Ã Is > > >> > > > your experience of yourself now in alignment with John > > >> > > > Searle's philosophy on "first person ontology"? > > >> > > > > >> > > Interesting find Emily, this is what the wiki says: > > >> > > > > >> > > "It can be tempting to see the theory as a kind of property > > >> > > dualism, since, in Searle's view, a person's mental properties > > >> > > are categorically different from his or her micro-physical > > >> > > properties. The latter have "third-person ontology" whereas > > >> > > the former have "first-person ontology." Micro-structure is > > >> > > accessible objectively by any number of people, as when > > >> > > several brain surgeons inspect a patient's cerebral hemispheres. > > >> > > But pain or desire or belief are accessible subjectively by the > > >> > > person who has the pain or desire or belief, and no one else has > > >> > > that mode of access." > > >> > > > > >> > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism > > >> > > > > >> > > If I understand this correctly, "first-person ontology" can > > >> > > only be subjectivly observed, and therefore refer to a > > >> > > consciousness process that is not observable by objective > > >> > > science. In a way it seems to be synonymous with the > > >> > > consciousness of a subject himself, but NOT, as Robin alludes > > >> > > to, with his sense of a separate I (I think thats what he is > > >> > > refering to). From what I read in this article, it is only > > >> > > about consciousness, being a property of brain processes, but > > >> > > 'as subjectivly experienced'. If I am not mistaken, this has > > >> > > nothing to do with free will, or it being the consciousness > > >> > > of a human being vs an animal. Whereas Robin seems to take it > > >> > > synonymous for the awareness of an 'I', that feels and is > > >> > > responsible for all his actions. To use such a relatively > > >> > > rare term like 'first-person ontology', for basically the > > >> > > sense of an 'I' and Doership, seems to me somewhat concealing > > >> > > rather than explaining. It certainly sound impressive. > > >> > > > >> > The term isn't that rare in discussions of philosophy > > >> > and consciousness, actually. Searle didn't invent it, > > >> > nor does he "own" it. > > >> > > >> Okay, I didn't know this. Probably like Emily, I just googled > > >> the term and the above wiki came up first. From the way it was > > >> expressed I had the (wrong) impression it was his term. > > >> > > >> > The term itself really doesn't > > >> > need much explanation. It may sound impressive to those > > >> > who aren't familiar with it, but it's a simple concept. > > >> > > >> And that is? Or what is the concept behind third-person ontology? > > > > > >First-person ontology: only I can know what it's > > >like to be me. Third-person ontology: you can > > >understand what it's like to be me via what I tell > > >you or what you observe of me, but it'll be quite > > >limited and may be false (because I'm lying or > > >otherwise behaving deceptively, or because I'm > > >communicating poorly or you're understanding > > >poorly). > > > > > >Your understanding of what it's like to be me is > > >a function of *your* first-person ontology: only > > >you can know what it's like to be you trying to > > >grasp what it's like to be me. Only I can know what > > >it's like to be me trying to grasp what it's like > > >to be you trying to grasp what it's like to be me. > > > > > >;-) > > > > > >or ;-(, depending... > > > > > >This isn't the *grammatical* third person, BTW. It > > >just means anybody other than me. (I just did a > > >search for "second person ontology" to make sure and > > >came up with only one hit, on an analysis of a poem > > >by e.e. cummings, where it refers to a literary > > >device.) > > > > > >> > It can be used in many different contexts and for many > > >> > different purposes. Searle makes use of it for his > > >> > purposes; Robin makes use of it for his purposes. What > > >> > requires explanation is the purposes, and Robin has > > >> > explained his pretty thoroughly: he's arguing against the > > >> > reality of Unity Consciousness, in which first-person > > >> > ontology is experienced to be illusionary and universal > > >> > consciousness the reality. As I understand him, he's > > >> > saying first-person ontology is the reality and universal > > >> > consciousness the illusion. > > >> > > >> I understand this so far. For example, does it simply mean > > >> that the consciousness of man is simply isolated, for example > > >> mind reading is not a reality. You cannot participate in the > > >> consciousness of somebody else, and therefore there is also > > >> no unity consciousness, is it that what you mean he is saying > > >> with it? > > > > > >Well, he says Unity Consciousness is a real state of > > >consciousness, but it isn't congruent with reality--or > > >Reality--as I understand him. I'm not sure mind reading > > >would be ruled out, depending on how you're defining it. > > >You might know some things that were in my mind via some > > >kind of telepathy--say at a distance--for instance, but > > >that wouldn't tell you what it's like to be me; it > > >wouldn't be participating in my consciousness. It would > > >still be third-person ontology, just using a different > > >means of communication. > > > > > >I'm flying blind here; Robin's going to have to bail us > > >out. > > > > > >It may be that Reality (cap R) above is equivalent to > > >God's will in Robin's thinking. > > > > > >ROBIN, HELP!! > > > > > >> > Nothing like Unity Consciousness figures in Searle's use > > >> > of the term; it isn't on his radar screen at all. Far as > > >> > I can tell, the closest he comes is to deny panpsychism. > > >> > He's using the term "first-person ontology" in the same > > >> > sense Robin is, but in an entirely different context to > > >> > make an entirely different type of argument: to demolish > > >> > functional materialism (although he also denies dualism, > > >> > which some see as contradictory). Searle does argue for > > >> > a form of free will, but it's based in quantum > > >> > indeterminism, not the classical form asserted by Robin. > > >> > > >> Yes, it wouldn't really have anything top do with it, > > >> which was basically my point. > > > > > >Don't know how, or if, Robin's assertion of classical free > > >will is directly related to first-person ontology in his > > >argument either. He says his experience of Unity > > >Consciousness was that he had no free will at all. But > > >there are some good scientific arguments that the > > >experience of having free will may be just that, an > > >experience, not the neurological reality. That doesn't > > >mean, however, that the universe is making all our > > >decisions for us. Rather, they're contingent on our wiring, > > >our genes, our background, the sum of our life experience > > >being-in-the-world. > > > > > >That would still be first-person ontology, what it's like > > >to be me--including my sense that I have free will. No > > >third person involved. > > > > > >> > Searle's arguments are considerably more sophisticated > > >> > philosophically and scientifically than Robin's, as it > > >> > happens; Robin's are experientially and theologically > > >> > based and are deeply personal. > > >> > > >> Sure. > > >> > > >> > In any case, it's pretty much coincidental that Searle > > >> > and Robin use the same term. Their respective arguments > > >> > are really unrelated. > > >> > > >> Anyway, thank you for taking the trouble and trying to > > >> explain, both you and Emily! > > > > > >My pleasure (literally; I enjoyed it, and I learned some > > >things as well). Thanks to Emily for coming up with the > > >question in the first place. > > > > > >Robin's going to have quite a mess to clean up... >
