--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@...> wrote:
> Robin's going to have quite a mess to clean up...
If you don't mind, I'm gonna be a bit more messy..
This is a very clear and beautiful explanation here Judy:
> First-person ontology: only I can know what it's
> like to be me. Third-person ontology: you can
> understand what it's like to be me via what I tell
> you or what you observe of me, but it'll be quite
> limited and may be false (because I'm lying or
> otherwise behaving deceptively, or because I'm
> communicating poorly or you're understanding
> poorly).
Isn't that basically saying that every person is closed up in his own
consciousness. It isn't really accessible to anyone else, except, mostly by
artificial means, through external knowledge, like a brain scientist, or
through ordinary communication, still you don't get it what it is to be 'you'.
> Your understanding of what it's like to be me is
> a function of *your* first-person ontology: only
> you can know what it's like to be you trying to
> grasp what it's like to be me. Only I can know what
> it's like to be me trying to grasp what it's like
> to be you trying to grasp what it's like to be me.
Yes, I am starting to get dizzy here slightly.
> ;-)
>
> or ;-(, depending...
>
> This isn't the *grammatical* third person, BTW. It
> just means anybody other than me. (I just did a
> search for "second person ontology" to make sure and
> came up with only one hit, on an analysis of a poem
> by e.e. cummings, where it refers to a literary
> device.)
>
> > > It can be used in many different contexts and for many
> > > different purposes. Searle makes use of it for his
> > > purposes; Robin makes use of it for his purposes. What
> > > requires explanation is the purposes, and Robin has
> > > explained his pretty thoroughly: he's arguing against the
> > > reality of Unity Consciousness, in which first-person
> > > ontology is experienced to be illusionary and universal
> > > consciousness the reality. As I understand him, he's
> > > saying first-person ontology is the reality and universal
> > > consciousness the illusion.
> >
> > I understand this so far. For example, does it simply mean
> > that the consciousness of man is simply isolated, for example
> > mind reading is not a reality. You cannot participate in the
> > consciousness of somebody else, and therefore there is also
> > no unity consciousness, is it that what you mean he is saying
> > with it?
>
> Well, he says Unity Consciousness is a real state of
> consciousness, but it isn't congruent with reality--or
> Reality--as I understand him.
That would presuppose that reality is already defined. If your first person
ontology, is real, and unity consciousness IS your first person ontological
experience, then it is real to you, no? This basically the approach of
phenomenology.
Anyway, I have a strong feeling that Robin misunderstands what Unity is about.
I will try to see it from the classical approach. Unity in this case is the
unity between Atman and Brahman, not the unity between me and a stone or you.
In vedanta afaik, the nonduality is a function of not identifying with the
separate I, but realizing that, in it's core, this I is only a reflection of
Brahman. In Brahman there is no duality, hence the oneness.
With all the uniqueness of my own conscious experience, which is even unique in
its reflection of Brahman, which is only known to me, there is still the more
generic fact of my humanness, and my being conscious. As an example, you might
imagine a glass of water, the glass, the limits of it, is my own 1st person
ontology, while the water, the more generic substance of it, is the Atman,
which is basically part of a greater whole, the Brahman.
You can also imagine that different glasses of water, reflect the same sun,
without loosing their individual boundaries, according to their colors, the
reflection will differ, but the recognition that it is ultimately the same
reflection, and the same light that is being reflected, is what I understand to
be the unity between atman and brahman.
> I'm not sure mind reading
> would be ruled out, depending on how you're defining it.
This is a very interesting point.
> You might know some things that were in my mind via some
> kind of telepathy--say at a distance--for instance, but
> that wouldn't tell you what it's like to be me; it
> wouldn't be participating in my consciousness. It would
> still be third-person ontology, just using a different
> means of communication.
Right. But the question here arises, of how far such a knowing could go? Maybe
somebody just can read your thoughts, okay, he doesn't yet feel what it is like
to be you, but somebody who could enter your mind more fundamentally, who
would get about 50% of all your thoughts and feelings, would come closer to
know that. He would indeed, participate partially in your consciousness. (Not
that it is this I understand unity consciousness to be).
And we might imagine, that the awareness of God, is exactly this, an awareness
of all 1st person ontologies, that God really knows what everyone feels, just
as it would be his own consciousness. This is how I think many religious people
view it, and Robin is of course believing in God. I know you can't answer this
Judy, but in this case God would indeed have a sort of a unity consciousness,
not as I propose it to be in the vedantic sense, but in a rather direct manner,
he indeed just might be this unity consciosuness himself - if this wouldn't be
so, you couldn't call him allmighty, omnipresent or all-knowing, right?
Or else, you believe in a sort of deistic God, not really in touch with your
awareness, or only partially so, who can meddle with your consciosuness, but
only partially, or if he choses so.
> I'm flying blind here; Robin's going to have to bail us
> out.
I actually feel more comfortable with your explanations, they are more clear to
my mind.
> It may be that Reality (cap R) above is equivalent to
> God's will in Robin's thinking.
Sure, but is there then anything in existence that isn't?
> ROBIN, HELP!!
>
> > > Nothing like Unity Consciousness figures in Searle's use
> > > of the term; it isn't on his radar screen at all. Far as
> > > I can tell, the closest he comes is to deny panpsychism.
> > > He's using the term "first-person ontology" in the same
> > > sense Robin is, but in an entirely different context to
> > > make an entirely different type of argument: to demolish
> > > functional materialism (although he also denies dualism,
> > > which some see as contradictory). Searle does argue for
> > > a form of free will, but it's based in quantum
> > > indeterminism, not the classical form asserted by Robin.
> >
> > Yes, it wouldn't really have anything top do with it,
> > which was basically my point.
>
> Don't know how, or if, Robin's assertion of classical free
> will is directly related to first-person ontology in his
> argument either. He says his experience of Unity
> Consciousness was that he had no free will at all. But
> there are some good scientific arguments that the
> experience of having free will may be just that, an
> experience, not the neurological reality. That doesn't
> mean, however, that the universe is making all our
> decisions for us. Rather, they're contingent on our wiring,
> our genes, our background, the sum of our life experience
> being-in-the-world.
>
> That would still be first-person ontology, what it's like
> to be me--including my sense that I have free will. No
> third person involved.
>
> > > Searle's arguments are considerably more sophisticated
> > > philosophically and scientifically than Robin's, as it
> > > happens; Robin's are experientially and theologically
> > > based and are deeply personal.
> >
> > Sure.
> >
> > > In any case, it's pretty much coincidental that Searle
> > > and Robin use the same term. Their respective arguments
> > > are really unrelated.
> >
> > Anyway, thank you for taking the trouble and trying to
> > explain, both you and Emily!
>
> My pleasure (literally; I enjoyed it, and I learned some
> things as well). Thanks to Emily for coming up with the
> question in the first place.
>
> Robin's going to have quite a mess to clean up...
>
