On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 09:57:01PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
> > Your back on legal loopholes. The fact is that the shielded node relies on
> > the existance of public nodes, so you have simply moved the target that
> > the enemy needs to have shut down.
>
> You don't move the target, you reduce its size. A smaller target is better
> because less nodes can get shut down. A system with *no* public nodes
> would be great if someone could come up with one. But a system with fewer
> public nodes (assuming that it doesn't break the network) is better.
I think it's the other way round. The more nodes there are, the harder
it is to shut them (all) down, especially when they are spread all over
the planet.
-Sven
--
God made everything out of nothing, but the nothingness shows through.
-- Paul Valery
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - ... Oskar Sandberg
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymit... Brandon
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anon... Ian Clarke
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator... Brandon
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Oper... Travis Bemann
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Oper... Brandon
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator... Oskar Sandberg
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anon... Oskar Sandberg
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator... Mr . Bad
- RE: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anon... Sven Neuhaus
- RE: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the ... Brandon
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - ... Ian Clarke
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymit... Brandon
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anon... Scott Gregory Miller
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - ... Matthew Toseland
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the issue... Aaron Voisine
- Re: [Freenet-dev] Node Operator Anonymity - the ... Oskar Sandberg
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