David Mirly wrote: > One of the more opposite views, however, is the Platonist view (I > think I have that right) where mathematical concepts > are a set of universal truths and we just discover them as opposed to > creating them.
Well, I don't want to object to the idea that Platonism opposes the claim that mathematics is a language; but I have to. [grin] Platonism doesn't strictly claim that _mathematics_ is truth. What it claims is that certain constructs, as described in mathematics, are true. Platonists will still agree that math is a language with which to describe reality. Non-platonists will claim that the stable constructs (described in math) are not true but either an artifact of the structure of the language or the social system that created the language and the constructs expressed in the language. But both Platonists and non-Platonists will agree that mathematics is a language and false things can be described in it. Platonism has a very strong case, though, because a soft form of it is simply that mathematics is the _best_ language for describing reality. And I'm a soft Platonist in that sense (albeit accepting the previously discussed inadequacy of our mathematical constructs in capturing paradox), which means I'll have to disagree with Dave in my next message. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
