The faith discussion seemed to fall apart, but might now be pulling itself back together - hence the slight subject change.
One variant of the pragmatic dictum, using James's catchy phrasing, is that "There is no difference that doesn't make a difference." In this particular situation, the there is no "I have faith that" which doesn't have imply "doing y will have z consequence". Now, it is certainly might be possible that the consequence of your faith do not include a particular type of outcome that someone else thinks should be logically consequent; i.e., it is possible your faith that P is true is separate from your faith that a particular event E will happen. However, it is not possible that your "faith that P is true" is completely disconnected from your faith that certain events will occur under certain circumstances. Perhaps the circumstances are unlikely to occur, perhaps the relevant circumstances are so far in the future or past as to be barely worth discussing in the present (outside of conversations like this), but ultimately "There is no difference that doesn't make a difference." People with Faith in P must be different in some set of circumstances from people without Faith in P, or there is no difference between having and not-having such faith. By the way, one interesting move someone could make in this conversation would be to claim that the crucial difference is that they claim to have Faith in P when asked. (This is, for example, how a subset of Christian's understand their "forgiveness" clause.) If that were accepted as true, then we would have to accept that there was no difference between "having Faith in P" and "claiming-to-have Faith in P" - you know, because if there is no difference then there is no difference. Thus, though that move might be tempting, the consequence is probably unpalatable to most. . Eric On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 01:20 AM, Russ Abbott <russ.abb...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >I've never spent much time studying modal logic. The <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxastic_logic> version of faith that I pointed to in the Stanford Encyc of Phil article is a model logic version. Your example sentences are overflowing with modal modifiers. Personally I don't see why I wouldn't agree to the sentences in your example. But as I've said before, we seem to be mixing a number of different senses of "faith." To have faith that P (is true) is different from to have faith that event E will happen. >> >> > >-- Russ Abbott >_____________________________________________> Professor, Computer Science > California State University, Los Angeles >> > >> My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977688> > Google voice: 747-999-5105 >> Google+: <https://plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/> > >> vita: <http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/> > >> <http://cs.calstatela.edu/wiki/> and the courses I teach >_____________________________________________ > > > > > > >>On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 9:29 PM, Nicholas Thompson <<#>> wrote: > > >If it is true that, > > >"Russ believes that his old and broken down motorcycle "can" take him from A > >to B, but he doesn't have faith that it "will"" > > >Can it also be true that Russ doubt whether his ... motorcycle can take him > >from A to B? Is it the case that, on your understanding, doubt and belief > >can exist in a person at the same time with respect to the same proposition? > > > >Nick > > >-----Original Message----- > >From: <#> [mailto:<#>] On Behalf > >Of Sarbajit Roy > >Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2012 9:37 PM > >To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > >Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith > > >It would take the inverse form > > >Faith is absolute acceptance whereas Belief is limited/conditional > >acceptance. > > >So Russ may have belief in X without having faith in it. > > >eg. > >"Russ believes that his old and broken down motorcycle "can" take him from A > >to B, but he doesn't have faith that it "will"" > > >On 9/24/12, Nicholas Thompson <<#>> wrote: > >> Russ, > >> > >> I take your point, but still, I would have a hard time composing a > >> sentence of the form, " Russ has faith in X but he doesn't believe in > >> it." Can you compose such a sentence for me? > >> > >> N > >> > >> > >> > >> From: <#> [mailto:<#>] On > >> Behalf Of Russ Abbott > >> Sent: Monday, September 24, 2012 12:42 AM > >> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith > >> > >> > >> > >> Nick, > >> > >> > >> > >> As I understand your position the words "faith" and "belief" are synonyms. > >> I > >> would prefer a definition for "faith" that distinguishes it from "belief." > >> > >> > >> > >> Tory, > >> > >> > >> > >> Thanks for you comment on my posts. I'm glad you enjoy them. > >> > >> > >> > >> My definition of faith makes use of the notion of the everyday world. > >> But I'm not saying that the everyday world is the same for everyone. > >> Your everyday world may be different from mine. I'm just saying that > >> believing that the world will continue to conform to your sense of > >> what the everyday world is like is not faith; it's simple belief. > >> > >> > >> > >> Eric, > >> > >> > >> > >> I would take "having faith in something" in the colloquial sense as > >> different from "faith" in a religious context, which is what I was > >> focusing on. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- Russ > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sun, Sep 23, 2012 at 9:27 PM, Victoria Hughes > >> <<#>> > >> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> Russ wrote, in part- > >> > >> > >> > >> Faith, I would say (in fact I did earlier) > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> is believing something that one wouldn't otherwise believe without faith. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Believing that the everyday world is the everyday world > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> doesn't seem to me to require faith. > >> > >> > >> > >> Russ, with all due respect for the enjoyment I get from your posts, I > >> find this suspiciously tautological. > >> > >> > >> > >> Who are you to define for the rest of humanity (and other sentient > >> life > >> forms) what 'the everyday world' incorporates? Numerous 'for instance' > >> cases > >> can immediately be made here. All you can do is define what you > >> believe for yourself. You cannot extrapolate what is defensible for > >> others to believe, from your own beliefs. > >> > >> > >> > >> And this statement ' Faith is believing something that one wouldn't > >> believe without faith'. Hm and hm again. > >> > >> > >> > >> Eagleman's new book Incognito > >> <<http://www.amazon.com/Incognito-Secret-Lives-David-Eagleman/dp/030738> > >> 9928/r > >> ef=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1348460523&sr=1-1&keywords=incognito+by+ > >> david+ > >> eagleman> offers fruitful information from recent neuroscience that > >> eagleman> may > >> interest others on this list. His ultimate sections bring up hard > >> questions about legal and ethical issues in the face of the myriad 'zombie > >programs' > >> that run most of our behaviour. This looks like - but is not as > >> simplistic as - 'yet another pop science book.' > >> > >> > >> > >> A review David Eagleman's > >> <<http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2011/06/david_eaglem> > >> <http://ans.ht> > >> ml> "Incognito" - Brainiac > >> > >> > >> > >> Tory > >> > >> > >> ============================================================ > >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe > >> at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at > >> <http://www.friam.org> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > >============================================================ > >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, > >unsubscribe, maps at <http://www.friam.org> > > > >============================================================ > >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at <http://www.friam.org> > > > > > > ============================================================ >FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College >lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ------------ Eric Charles Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601
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