On 11/12/2013 04:09 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
I think we are about to bore the shite out of the rest of the crowd,
Heh, that ship has sailed, man. But, I'll try to keep this one short.
I *may* choose to step over a given rock rather than around it or onto it, but it is likely I spied it several steps before that choice was required and added it's presence into some kind of weighted heuristic. *IF* I find myself at the rock having to decide the trinary, over/around/on it is likely that I had already queued up the most likely decision ahead of time when first I noticed it and later as I navigated deliberately toward (or at least not away from) it. I find thinking about complex problems "rationally" to be something like this navigation I describe.
I would only describe that (specific) type of thinking as rational if you were able to weigh multiple paths against each other. So, to be rational would be less about contrasting multiple instantaneous decisions inside a path and more about weighing whole paths. If you can only see one way in which to navigate the terrain, then I'd say you're being irrational (or at least non-rational).
Of course, making a *rational argument* involves retracing many of the steps I took while thinking my way through the landscape and explaining each one (in painful detail I'm sure) to anyone who is interested in the landscape (and will listen... e.g. isn't prone to TL;DR ).
That you separate doing from arguing is interesting. For me, everything's an argument. I argue mostly with simulated opponents, where I play the role of my adversar[y|ies] ... It's so much that way that it's often difficult for me to identify with any one role. None of the participants in my mental arena are really 'me', or the most 'me'. There's a little bit of me in every one of my simulated opponents. When it gets interesting is the ongoing competition _while_ I'm doing something. As I'm working on, say, my buell, there's this cacophony from the virtual peanut gallery in my head, some of them cheering when something works well, some of them jeering when something goes wrong.
But I'll admit that reconstructing justifications for any sequence of actions I've taken is different from actually taking them. And planning for a sequence (or a network, if I'm planning for a team of people) of actions is very different from actually executing a plan. So, if by "argument", you really mean either planning or reconstructing, then I agree. The "rational" qualifier for each (plan, do, reconstruct) has slightly different semantics.
Whether you agree with the specifics of how all that came down, I think you *might* be able to separate into two clusters, the intentions based on an assumed harm done by another which suggests a response, and the recognition than another is not in a good position to defend themselves and has something you want, suggesting some form of violence or threat of violence as a course of action.
OK. I confess that I do have 2 primary measures of "bad": 1) opacity - as we've discussed and 2) asymmetry. In any asymmetric relationship, the one(s) with the advantage has the moral responsibility to modify/regulate their own actions so that the one(s) with the disadvantage isn't (unwillingly) exploited or bullied. I should say _try_ to modify/regulate... because it's a _very_ difficult thing to do, for anyone. And if there are more than 2 parties, even perceiving 3 or more dimensions is hard, much less measuring the amount of symmetry in those dimensions.
As long as there's strong evidence that transparency and symmetry are salient, the action(s) are acceptable.
Picking on poor Barry here, ...
Sorry. I don't mean to pick on him. I actually think he's been an excellent president, though I didn't vote for his 2nd term. He's a useful foil.
... and he wasn't a whackadoodle "Maverick" so there was no contest, ...
Ugh. I sincerely wish She Who Must Not Be Named would disappear.
I get that, but I can't separate "free will" from a sense of identity. I guess I've not practiced thinking enough impossible things before breakfast because an "I" without a free will seems... empty?
Perhaps we use different meanings of 'will'? I tend to think of it in terms of momentum. E.g. some people have told me that I have "will power", in that I control my diet fairly well, exercise regularly, work consistently (even when my "office" is in a bedroom of the house), etc. I tend to think of it in terms of habit, not "will power". I don't really know what those people mean by "will power" when they say it. To me, I do what I do because I establish a preferred set of behaviors (through rational comparison/contrast) and then do them. Usually, part of my rational comparison involves trying various behaviors out to see if they're sustainable. If momentum develops, I maintain them for awhile, making minor tweaks in response to micro-evolution in the environment. Then I start the process over in response to macro-evolution. So, the way I take what they mean is the momentum that develops after/as I find behaviors that sustain.
Free will, on the other hand, is the wiggle, the play, the slop we all experience while engaged in our will(s). E.g. sometimes I buy coffee beans and grind them myself, sometimes I buy it pre-ground. Why? I don't know... because it's random. That's an overly simplified example, of course. There are much more pervasive restrictions and determinants for which type of coffee I buy. But the gist is there: the freedom being discussed in "free will" is the random wiggle inside a byzantine complex of intertwined constraints of varying rigidity. At least, that's my favorite alternative.
-- ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella Roll up your expectations, and feed them into my sleep ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
