Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: *The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine?*
I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" John likely finds that to be an ugly, crude abuse of his idea. In protest he might assert: "That isn't it at all! I am interested in whether Charlemagne ate eggs *then*, and not about anything now. It makes no difference now!" At that point, Peirce would, in a rare instance of generosity, look towards his friend James with gentle nod. James would get quite excited and proclaim triumphantly that "A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all." Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If *Charlemagne did it* has all the same consequences as *Charlemagne didn't do it*, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" And.... most likely.... a Wittgensteinian silence would ensue. Now, on the other hand, if you COULD give a list of things that would be distinct about the world, had that event happened, then the conversation might proceed differently. But that is typically not possible. Note, that doesn't make all claims about the past flawed. For example, there are geologists who investigate what rocks will look like at different depths in different locations, based on different hypotheses about how the earth was millennia ago, and how tectonic plates have moved in the meantime. That is good science in Peirce's view. However, that moves us away from claims about individual events (see prior email regarding The Baseball), and towards testing hypotheses that resemble standard scientific hypotheses. That is not to say that *nothing *is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" *as the scientist understands it* does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles < eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > John, > First, the sad part, it is unclear how any of this relates to gaining > consensus about individual events. I think it should, but others shouldn't. > Let me lay out the problem: > > We wonder whether a given baseball is the one thrown for a particular > strike during a particular game. What unique properties would such a ball > have? There are two types of answers we might seek. > > One is a unique configuration of differences, i.e., the ball had a mixture > of resin and spit used by a particular pitcher to doctor their pitch, and > was the only one of its kind to have been made at the factory with a > one-off improper spelling of the company name. In such a case we may apply > the scientific process to determine if the ball in question has those > properties, and (potentially) determine the extent to which those > properties are actually unique. That is, we could test through empirical > method, all consequences of the claim that the ball in question is The > Ball. > > The other type of answer we might seek is via "providence"; i.e., there is > nothing unique about the ball itself, but there is other evidence it might > be of historic importance. We might have a picture of the ump tossing a > ball to a particular kid, record of that kid giving it over to an auction > house several years later, that auction house selling it to Rich Guy A, who > owned a storage unit, in which Rich Guy B found *a* *ball *(after A's > death) along with the paperwork referenced and associated photos. Here we > could test, through the empirical method, all sorts of claims about the > providence itself (was it printed on the right type of paper, does the > signature look authentic, etc.) but there is nothing to test about the ball > pre se. > > In *either *case it is unclear that investigating history would resemble > making a scientific claim, because scientific claims are about > generalities, not individual events. To claim that vinegar will dissolve > calcium build ups is a very different type of thing than to claim that this > ball is The Ball. The science above is not direct at the veracity of the > historical claims, but rather it is directed at some things that would be > true about the objects in front of us, were those historic claims true. > > Even worse, I think Peirce would assert that unless there is something > about the ball itself that is in question, the question of whether it is > The Ball is nonsensical. > > Whew! I hope some of that was relevant. > > Best, > Eric > > > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Lab Manager > Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning > American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A > 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. > Washington, DC 20016 > phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 > email: echar...@american.edu > > On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison <jkenni...@clarku.edu> > wrote: > >> I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to >> apply it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all >> we have are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects >> and/or documents really go back to a historical period under >> examination--but we have some way of testing for various relations between >> these relics. Se then look for a theory of the past which best accounts for >> the relics that we have. We may be able to measure how well different >> theories do this accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then >> history. >> >> But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth >> about what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not >> be recoverable. >> >>
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