Hi Nick, At one point you suggested I work on digesting some things that eric Charles said. The part that I think I understood was the distinction between Young Peirce and Old Peirce, That young Peirce would say " 'Truth' as the scientist understands it does not come into it." while Old Peirce would say " 'Truth' does not come into it". You sound like a Old Peirecian, Eric seems to like young Peirce and I would prefer Young Peirce but long to go beyond that to assert that there are truths that are not scientifically comprehensible.
As an example, suppose I am a night watchman for a building and at 10pm I hear a funny sound in the basement. It occurs to me that I can check the continuous video surveillance to see if it caught anything that might have produced the sound. So the question is: "Did the video record anything that might have produced the funny sound?" . The question makes sense because I can resolve it by viewing the video. But further suppose that I get involved in helping someone in need (for example, a person stuck in the elevator. When I have finished doing that, I realize the video is on a continuous loop which erases over and reuses the tape unless new tape is installed. Now there is no longer a way to ascertain whether the (old) video recorded anything that might have produced the funny noise. It seems to say that a question about the past may once have been a reasonable question but later was no longer a legitimate question. Why can't I ask whether the video, at one time, caught a relevant im age? ________________________________________ From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Nick Thompson [nickthomp...@earthlink.net] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 10:38 PM To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Hi, John, Not sure Peirce would go with "truths". I think he regarded scientific explanation as the formalization of a universal human cognitive capacity and therefore we are all fated to believe what scientists are fated to believe. Truth is what we will all come to believe in the very long run. Others may correct me on this. But notice how we are proceeding -- as if there is some state of belief with respect to Peirce's beliefs that will, in time, settle the matter. If there is such a settling belief, than there is, by definition, a truth; if there is no such ultimate settling of belief, than there is no truth of the matter. Take note of Eric's observation that, according to Peirce, order in experience is kind of a miracle. A rarity in a world that is essentially random. We are still in the weeds, here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of John Kennison Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 5:33 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Hi Eric, Thanks for responding. I didn't follow all that you said, but I like what young Peirce (who might have said) "Truth as the scientist understands it" --and therefore seems to allow for a different kind of truth. And I could have chosen a better example --say the dispute between Bush and Gore about who really won the crucial state of Florida. There the truth didn't seem to affect the decision, but if the court had been divided 4-4 with 1 independent, it might have. The courts do have ways of deciding cases based on truth as the scientist understands it --that is clearly the only way the judicial system can function --but I gather that Old Peirce would say there is no other truth. Am I under a delusion that there may be actual truths about the past that are simply lost? --John ________________________________________ From: Friam [friam-boun...@redfish.com] on behalf of Eric Charles [eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, February 23, 2016 3:44 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; M. D. Bybee; John Shook Subject: Re: [FRIAM] History and subjectivity and intimacy Trying to bring things to this thread... John said: The crucial questions then, are do you see any talk about "what really happened in the past" as some sort of delusion? Would you go one step further and say the concept that there is a truth about what happened in the past is delusional, for example "We have no way of knowing for certain whether Charlemagne ate eggs on a particulr day during his life(Say January 1, 800 ad) but there is a truth about the matter (either he did or did not) even though it is a truth we can never fully determine? I think Peirce would try to dissolve this controversy . He would say, I think, that the question "Did Charlemagne eat eggs on January 1st, 800 ad?" can only sensibly be understood as the question "Conceive of everything that would be true of the world now, had the event in question occurred. Do all investigations thereby implied pan out?" John likely finds that to be an ugly, crude abuse of his idea. In protest he might assert: "That isn't it at all! I am interested in whether Charlemagne ate eggs then, and not about anything now. It makes no difference now!" At that point, Peirce would, in a rare instance of generosity, look towards his friend James with gentle nod. James would get quite excited and proclaim triumphantly that "A difference which makes no difference is no difference at all." Then quickly, before James could go further and say something upsetting, Peirce would jump back in and ask, "If Charlemagne did it has all the same consequences as Charlemagne didn't do it, then what on earth do YOU think you are getting on about?" And.... most likely.... a Wittgensteinian silence would ensue. Now, on the other hand, if you COULD give a list of things that would be distinct about the world, had that event happened, then the conversation might proceed differently. But that is typically not possible. Note, that doesn't make all claims about the past flawed. For example, there are geologists who investigate what rocks will look like at different depths in different locations, based on different hypotheses about how the earth was millennia ago, and how tectonic plates have moved in the meantime. That is good science in Peirce's view. However, that moves us away from claims about individual events (see prior email regarding The Baseball), and towards testing hypotheses that resemble standard scientific hypotheses. That is not to say that nothing is at stake in the investigation about Charlemagne's eating habits, it is simply to say that "truth" does not come into it. Old Peirce would, I think simply declare that. I like younger Peirce better. Younger Peirce often explicitly presents himself as explaining the world view of the scientist. Thus, were this about just the parts of Peirce I like best, I would modify the prior: "Truth" as the scientist understands it does not come into it. Were I to say that, James would smile, and pat me on the back heroically. Meanwhile, Peirce would get to work writing an entire book about how I am an intellectual incompetent, and might well rename his entire system simply to avoid association with anything I had said. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867 fax: (202) 885-1190 email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com<mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>> wrote: John, First, the sad part, it is unclear how any of this relates to gaining consensus about individual events. I think it should, but others shouldn't. Let me lay out the problem: We wonder whether a given baseball is the one thrown for a particular strike during a particular game. What unique properties would such a ball have? There are two types of answers we might seek. One is a unique configuration of differences, i.e., the ball had a mixture of resin and spit used by a particular pitcher to doctor their pitch, and was the only one of its kind to have been made at the factory with a one-off improper spelling of the company name. In such a case we may apply the scientific process to determine if the ball in question has those properties, and (potentially) determine the extent to which those properties are actually unique. That is, we could test through empirical method, all consequences of the claim that the ball in question is The Ball. The other type of answer we might seek is via "providence"; i.e., there is nothing unique about the ball itself, but there is other evidence it might be of historic importance. We might have a picture of the ump tossing a ball to a particular kid, record of that kid giving it over to an auction house several years later, that auction house selling it to Rich Guy A, who owned a storage unit, in which Rich Guy B found a ball (after A's death) along with the paperwork referenced and associated photos. Here we could test, through the empirical method, all sorts of claims about the providence itself (was it printed on the right type of paper, does the signature look authentic, etc.) but there is nothing to test about the ball pre se. In either case it is unclear that investigating history would resemble making a scientific claim, because scientific claims are about generalities, not individual events. To claim that vinegar will dissolve calcium build ups is a very different type of thing than to claim that this ball is The Ball. The science above is not direct at the veracity of the historical claims, but rather it is directed at some things that would be true about the objects in front of us, were those historic claims true. Even worse, I think Peirce would assert that unless there is something about the ball itself that is in question, the question of whether it is The Ball is nonsensical. Whew! I hope some of that was relevant. Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Lab Manager Center for Teaching, Research, and Learning American University, Hurst Hall Room 203A 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20016 phone: (202) 885-3867<tel:%28202%29%20885-3867> fax: (202) 885-1190<tel:%28202%29%20885-1190> email: echar...@american.edu<mailto:echar...@american.edu> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:51 AM, John Kennison <jkenni...@clarku.edu<mailto:jkenni...@clarku.edu>> wrote: I don't know it I am following all this correctly, but I would like to apply it to the question of doing History scientifically. At the start all we have are relics from the past --maybe we are uncertain which objects and/or documents really go back to a historical period under examination--but we have some way of testing for various relations between these relics. Se then look for a theory of the past which best accounts for the relics that we have. We may be able to measure how well different theories do this accounting. And the set opf measutres we arrive at is then history. But would some historian be dualists if they say there is a real truth about what happened in the past, it's just that we this real truth may not be recoverable. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
