Nick, Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.
The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ... > 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our > "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? > **[NST===>] I don’t think so. Increasing the number of people who think that > “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no > implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.** ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE). NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology. The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x." Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it. davew On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: > David, > > I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so > figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all. > See larding below. > > n > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > thompnicks...@gmail.com > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West > Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM > To: friam@redfish.com > Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us > > Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying > to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope > that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the > light will illuminate clarity. > > Pierce said: > > "Consider what effects, **that might** conceivably have practical bearings, > we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of > these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." > > The Donald is our object > **[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because > “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general. > Abduction is to generals. I think this is a cheap response, because, while > The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a > lower level general. “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a > reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is > not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a > real ** > > > 1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we > expect our object to have?**[NST===>] ** **Eric might help us here, but > basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point. It > seems to me a monstrous category error. Objects are just not the sorts of > things that have effects. Events have effects. Actions have effects. Thanks > reminding me of this problem. I always supply words when I read the maxim, > such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to > some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that > would arise from conceiving of the object way. So, if we conceive of DT as a > liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are > the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. ** > 2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects? > 2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is > defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is > exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti > perspectives/convictions, maybe not.**[NST===>] ** > **[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about > meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] > a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his > forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. ** > 3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we > might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T > becoming a dictator.]**[NST===>] ** **The question is not about the meaning > of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense. The > question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so > concerns the meaning of that general. If we were to test by observation the > proposition that Trump is a dictator, what tests would we employ. These > tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. ** > is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that > effectuating** [NST===>] I don’t think so. What “unicorn” means to me has no > implications for the existence of unicorns. ** > 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our > "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? > **[NST===>] I don’t think so. Increasing the number of people who think that > “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no > implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns. ** > > 5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a > conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the > object? > > I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to > Pierce and prompted the above questions. > Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why > pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?" > **[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is. Evolutionary > epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection > mechanisms. People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a > jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight. Well, I suppose. ** > > davew > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
