If I read this post with a little empathy, it seems very provocative, indeed. 
Good job.

You start by striking a posture of checking your "in your own words" with 
Nick's. But you end with the suggestion that Pierce's work has nothing to offer 
in understanding what knowledge is, etc. And you obviously understand that Nick 
believes Pierce DOES offer at least some assistance in that effort.

If you were in a physical fight, this would be a *feint*, where you pretend to 
check your own words against Nick with your right hand. But then quickly punch 
him in the kidney with your left.

An authentic attempt to steel-man why Nick might believe Pierce can contribute 
to your effort might consist of identifying, for example, how establishing the 
truth of one's (or many's) conception of an object (which you admit Pierce 
helps with) might *indirectly* contribute to understanding the existence of 
those target objects. Personally, it's not clear to me that Pierce's words, 
themselves, help much in that regard. But his intellectual descendants' words 
*do* help, John Woods for me. But maybe others for you.

On 2/20/20 12:54 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your 
> answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need 
> to check if I have it correct.
> 
> The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...
> 
>> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our 
>> "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
>>
>> */[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think 
>> that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no 
>> implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns./*
>>
> 
>  ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized 
> epistemology (NE).
> 
> NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for 
> understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural 
> sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset 
> would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to 
> survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.
> 
> The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is 
> deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of 
> meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not 
> we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot 
> tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."
> 
> Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my 
> quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we 
> know if we have it.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ

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