Well, gosh, now Nick has me all confused... Dave, when you say that Peirce can't help with "knowledge", are you invoking some continental-philosophy notion of "definitively-correct, fully-justified true belief"? Or are you instead talking about whatever people are talking about when they *claim* to know things (or *feel* like they know things)? Peirce can, I think, help with the latter. He can't help with the former, because he doesn't think it exists. In Peirce-land there is no denying that we are messy systems engaged in messy activities, including in regards to our cognitions.
----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist American University - Adjunct Instructor <echar...@american.edu> On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 3:08 PM <thompnicks...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, Dave, > > > > See Larding below: > > > > Nicholas Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > thompnicks...@gmail.com > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > > > *From:* Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West > *Sent:* Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM > *To:* friam@redfish.com > *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us > > > > Nick, > > > > Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because > your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I > need to check if I have it correct. > > > > The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ... > > > > 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our > "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? > > *[NST===>] I don’t think so. Increasing the number of people who think > that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no > implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.* > > > > ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about > naturalized epistemology (NE). > > > > NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches > for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the > natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A > subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order > to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology. > > > > The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is > deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings > of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or > not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It > cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x." > > *[NST===>] Ok, you’ve got my head spinning here. I think you have it > exactly backwards. Leaving the Donald out of it for a moment, because I > think he confuses us, I think discriminating the LIKELY truth of an > assertion of fact is EXACTLY what pragmatism is about. Mathematical > statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false but meaningless. > Just a matter, as Peirce would say, of what language you chose to speak. > And yes, in a broad sense Peirce is engaged in a vague form of evolutionary > epistemology since he vaguely attributes the predictive power of habit > formation to natural selection. * > > > > *If you asked me, a purported pragmatist, where knowledge comes from and > what knowledge is ‘about’, I would say that knowledge comes from past > experience and it is about future experience. This includes historical > knowledge. If I am told that Indians camp, fished, and hunted on a low > hill at the bend of the river near the Mosquito Infested Bog (hereafrer, > MIB), then that information MEANS, among many other things, that I should > be able to find some nice arrowheads down there.* > > > > Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in > my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how > we know if we have it. > > *[NST===>] I didn’t see the kidney punch (until Glen pointed it out); all > I knew, before that, was that my lower back was sore. I agree with Glen > that if ever crocodile tears were shed, you shed them when you wrote the > word “alas”.* > > > > *N* > > > > davew > > > > > > > > On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, thompnicks...@gmail.com wrote: > > David, > > > > I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so > figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all. > See larding below. > > > > n > > > > Nicholas Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > > Clark University > > thompnicks...@gmail.com > > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West > > Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM > > To: friam@redfish.com > > Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us > > > > Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not > trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the > hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that > the light will illuminate clarity. > > > > Pierce said: > > > > "Consider what effects, *that might* conceivably have practical bearings, > we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of > these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." > > > > The Donald is our object > > *[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded > because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a > general. Abduction is to generals. I think this is a cheap response, > because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a > general, it is still a lower level general. “Is it true that The Donald is > over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how > many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by > definition, The Donald is a real * > > > > > > 1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we > expect our object to have?*[NST===>] * *Eric might help us here, but > basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point. It > seems to me a monstrous category error. Objects are just not the sorts of > things that have effects. Events have effects. Actions have effects. > Thanks reminding me of this problem. I always supply words when I read the > maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as > opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the > expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way. So, if we > conceive of DT as a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, > and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other > meaning. * > > 2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects? > > 2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is > defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is > exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti > perspectives/convictions, maybe not.*[NST===>] * > > *[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about > meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to > me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his > forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. * > > 3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality > we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T > becoming a dictator.]*[NST===>] * *The question is not about the meaning > of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense. The > question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and > so concerns the meaning of that general. If we were to test by observation > the proposition that Trump is a dictator, what tests would we employ. > These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. * > > is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that > effectuating* [NST===>] I don’t think so. What “unicorn” means to me has > no implications for the existence of unicorns. * > > 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our > "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object? > > *[NST===>] I don’t think so. Increasing the number of people who think > that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no > implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns. * > > > > 5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a > conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the > object? > > > > I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me > to Pierce and prompted the above questions. > > Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why > pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?" > > *[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is. Evolutionary > epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection > mechanisms. People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a > jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight. Well, I suppose. * > > > > davew > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe > http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove >
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove