On Sun, Jun 30, 2019 at 03:49:55AM -0700, Mirimir via Gnupg-users wrote:
c) what happens when they go after more certificates?
If you're willing to blackhole two certs, great. Where does it stop?
How many certs can the strong set stand to lose?
Your third point is actually why I suggested this. Maybe I'm just
twisted, but what if some dickhead goes after certs that would break
stuff for millions of people? One might, for example, block Linux kernel
maintenance and development. Maybe just before using some 0-day.
I highly doubt this would be effective, mainly because I don't think
anyone on the kernel development side of things runs keyring refreshes
in any routine fashion -- if ever. For those relying on PGP to verify
downloaded releases, we provide WKD lookups
(https://www.kernel.org/signature.html).
This whole thing *will* probably push me towards setting up a Hagrid
instance, especially if we can teach it to compare submissions against
an allow-list. Not sure what I'm going to do about the whole "web of
trust" side of things, though. I *really* don't like the idea of setting
up any kind of certification/trust authority.
-K
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