> And yes, hkps://keys.openpgp.org would fall over and die if too many > users started using it. So cert poisoning will be an issue until there's > a secure alternative.
Just as a point of interest, I've talked to the people running keys.openpgp.org about their capacity in #hagrid, when we were exploring whether to change the default keyserver in Nixpkgs' GnuPG[1] (which we ended up doing). The impression I got was that they're very optimistic about their ability to handle traffic to their server -- they were happy to have a distro make the switch, and will be changing the defaults in Enigmail and OpenKeychain very soon, as I understand it. It is a real shame that a decentralized Hagrid isn't really possible, though, at least to my understanding. It's quite the limitation for GnuPG. [1]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/63952
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