Hi Christopher + Eric,

thanks for your feedback. You are right, i really underestimated the risk 
of such attacks.

I will lock the key-holding memory in the next release.

cheers,

Matthias


Am Montag, 15. Oktober 2018 23:13:32 UTC+2 schrieb Christopher Nielsen:
>
> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 1:28 PM Matthias Schmidt 
> <matthias...@gmail.com <javascript:>> wrote: 
> > 
> > Hi Eric, 
> > 
> > thanks *a lot* for your valuable feedback! I really appreciate it. See 
> comments inline: 
> > 
> > Am Montag, 15. Oktober 2018 12:09:32 UTC+2 schrieb EricR: 
> >> 
> >> Since you're looking for opinions on the security concept, two 
> questions spring immediately to my mind: 
> >> 
> >> 1. Does the daemon keep the sensitive data in locked memory that cannot 
> be paged out? If so, how cross-platform is this? 
> > 
> > 
> > No it doesn't. As of now i consider the root-user a good guy ;-) 
> > He's the only one who could access the pagefiles anyway. 
> > 
> > So is this really an issue? If yes i could use this cross-platform 
> solution to pin the key: 
> > 
> > https://github.com/awnumar/memguard 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 2. How does the client communicate securely with the daemon? Which 
> encryption protocol/handshake is used for this? (If it just uses a socket, 
> what would prevent another process from reading out the master password?) 
> > 
> > 
> > It's in fact a unix domain socket file which is only accessible for the 
> owner of the key. ( Thanks for bringing this up, i forgot to flag the file 
> correctly - it's now fixed). 
> > Relying on the file permissions in unix shouldn't be a problem, right? 
> > 
> > cheers & again - many thanks, 
> > 
> > Matthias 
>
> You seem to be putting a lot of trust in facilities that are trivially 
> exploitable to a determined attacker. For software like a password 
> manager, assuming the kernel is secure is a poor security model. In 
> addition to the existing attack surface, we live in a world where 
> side-channel attacks are becoming more common, e.g., Spectre and 
> Meltdown, so it isn't safe to assume the kernel or hardware are 
> secure. A password manager needs to have a robust security model that 
> has a minimal trust model if it is to be more than a toy. 
>
> Just my $0.02 
>
> -- 
> Christopher Nielsen 
> "They who can give up essential liberty for temporary safety, deserve 
> neither liberty nor safety." --Benjamin Franklin 
> "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the 
> blood of patriots & tyrants." --Thomas Jefferson 
>

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