Philip Homburg <pch-homene...@u-1.phicoh.com> wrote: >>>> ddos attack like against Dyn >> >> I could be wrong, but I believe that Dyn was DDoSed by the Mirai >> botnet, which propagates by exploiting devices configured with default >> credentials. This has nothing to do with outdated firmwares.
> The problem is that you cannot realistically update those firmwares. > If is trivial to compile a new firmware for those devices that doesn't > request upnp to open ports to telnet or ssh. But is is impossible to > deploy such an update. > For consumer electronics, we cannot rely on consumers to actually > download and install new firmware. So part of the solution to securing > those devices has to be that (out of the box) they will update > automatically. Which in some implementations, means having a clock to know that your current firmware is actually newer than the "proposed" new firmware (which is really much older), or knowing that it's been too long since a firmware load. If update cycle expects a new firmware every 6 months, but at the same time, won't install firmware older than 1 year, you need a clock. An attacker that can force time backwards, can set it back to that time when the telnet port was open with the default password... (It's not fake firmware afterall, it has a signature and everything). And you can't force people to monotonically go up in versions, because bugs do occur, and people need to "undo"... > For the same reason, having lots of devices on the internet that have > been abandoned by the vendor is also a huge security risk. So ideally > those devices should shutdown automatically. again, some notion of current time, so the device can reasonably die. (And in this case, getting too new time might be a threat) > Note that PCs, browsers, etc. are now somewhat secure because they > update automatically. We need to do the same will all other devices > connected to the internet. > _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list > homenet@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet -- Michael Richardson <mcr+i...@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
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