On Mon, 5 May 2008 09:51:04 -0500, Paul Gilmartin wrote: >But the hazard is manifest not when an authorized program obtains >storage in a user key, but when an unauthorized program modifies >that storage. Perhaps the solution would be to allocate user key >CSA only in a subpool that would be segment-protected from >modification by programs which are not APF authorized.
That's not necessary. it should be allocated using a non-user key. There's no need to define a new subpool for the purpose. The program making the allocation would still have to be changed. In any case, it wouldn't help for systems that were designed to require that user key programs make some kind of update. -- Tom Marchant ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with the message: GET IBM-MAIN INFO Search the archives at http://bama.ua.edu/archives/ibm-main.html
