Tom,

as Mike said there are a lot of companies I know of that are using "CMS" 
applications for day to day work and the DATA resides on "VM"

they are using "FOCUS" for report generation , as well as "MAILBOOK" for 
e-mail and interoffice file transfers , and some are using VM:Backup and 
VM:Archive and the Shared File System for numerous versions of Source Code 
like GDG's on TSO and submitting their compiles and assembles to VM:Batch 
for processing.  There is still a lot of WORK being done on "VM" and these 
companies are not running any other "OS" as a guest of these "VM" systems. 
 They might and do have other "VM"'s for running LINUX or "VSE" . 

Granted it is a vast minority of what it was 10, 15, and 20 years ago.

munson




From:   Tom Huegel <tehue...@gmail.com>
To:     IBMVM@LISTSERV.UARK.EDU
Date:   12/10/2010 09:16 AM
Subject:        Re: Vswitch Grant as a CMD in User's Directory?
Sent by:        The IBM z/VM Operating System <IBMVM@LISTSERV.UARK.EDU>



Does anyone run applications in z/VM? Isn't the 'protected data' owned by 
some other OS (z/OS, z/VSE, zLINUX). It seems that the high level security 
effort belongs in those OS's. z/VM just needs to keep those systems 
isolated and NOT be able to circumvent their security procedures.  

On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 2:46 AM, Les Koehler <vmr...@tampabay.rr.com> 
wrote:
Back in the old days, I recall a finance type person saying something 
like: The Gold Standard is that it should take collusion between two or 
more people to defraud the company.

If we apply that to IT, then shouldn't pswds for privileged userids that 
can access/change financial data be long enough that TWO sysprogs can each 
be given half a pswd so they both have to be present to make a change?

Les


Alan Altmark wrote:
On Thursday, 12/09/2010 at 12:01 EST, Tom Huegel <tehue...@gmail.com> 
wrote:
Does it really matter? SOX is just another way congress has come up with 
to 
destroy the American economy, and in fact the American way of life.

When you read the law, you find that SOX is "simply" a way to hold 
executives responsible for the financial statements issued by their 
companies.  Assuming no ill intent (no comments, please!), that means 
trustworthy data.  That flows downhill, as all such things must, until we 
start talking about access controls and audit mechanisms for financial 
data.  That is, knowing who has the means and the opportunity to access 
the data, and knowing who has actually done so.  (I leave it to others to 
talk about motive.)  Who, what, where, when.

Unfortunately, IT security industry consultants have mangled this laudable 
concept into a paranoia-inducing behemoth that has people screaming in 
terror as it rampages across the country, flogging every sysadmin in its 
path.  Why?  Because financial status is inferred from many other data 
sources and no one wants to spend the time it takes to follow all the data 
flows.  Result: Secure Everything.

With HIPAA and PCI running alongside, the "Secure Everything" policy looks 
even more reasonable to CEOs, CIOs, CFOs, and their lawyers.

Alan Altmark

z/VM and Linux on System z Consultant
IBM System Lab Services and Training ibm.com/systems/services/labservices 
office: 607.429.3323
alan_altm...@us.ibm.com
IBM Endicott




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